


RS-EER-90-051  
6 APRIL 1990



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

JPRS-EER-90-051

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16 APRIL 1990

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### List of New Slovak Youth Organizations

90CH0001A Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 2 Mar 90  
pp 6-7

[Unattributed report: "Now Let Me Think Which Way I Should Go..."]

[Text]

#### AMAVET

AMAVET, a new autonomous, independent and nonpolitical avocational organization to foster creative science and research activity among children and young people, came into being on 4 January 1990 in Prague.

Its goals is to provide all-round support for the formation and operation of clubs—as the association's basic units—which will develop creative abilities among children and youth. At the same time it formulates and defends the interests of its membership base vis-a-vis state organs and other social organizations. AMAVET does not disrupt well-functioning institutions. Individual units operate independently and can become members of the association regardless of who organized them. Thus it brings all basic units to one common level—VTCM clubs, circles at children's homes and schools, technology and natural science sections, SMT and SMP at enterprises and plants, clubs for electronics fanciers, radio ham operators, model builders and the like. AMAVET operates on democratic principles; until a general assembly in March 1990 its activities are directed by an executive council elected at the founding meeting.

The association's center for the activities of basic units disseminates the latest information on science and technology, information on forms and methods of youth work, on the activities of similar organizations abroad, opportunities for staying abroad, on resident exchanges and current projects in the field. At the same time AMAVET does not direct the basic units; it merely coordinates their work by designing the framework for a variety of contests and competitions on both national and international level. As a matter of principle the center does not interfere with the ways in which the activity of individual units is funded. The clubs are financed by their organizing body but the association supports their entrepreneurial activities. AMAVET itself may also organize clubs. To the extent of its funding ability it may contribute to the setting up and operation of clubs, assist them in acquiring equipment, contribute to their operating expenses, to organizing seminars, courses, international exchanges, to the cost of honorariums for outside experts, to employee wages and so on. Of value here is this association's ability to obtain, also from abroad, modern materials for polytechnic instruction. All this enables it to gain authority as well as popularity among the young people, especially when it organizes on a statewide level special courses, summer

gatherings, participation of talented youths in summer schools and excursions abroad. In order to assure a funding base it is establishing the J.A. Komensky Foundation. By the way, among AMAVET's honorary members is Dr. Michal Sumichrast.

[By Marian Keckes]

#### Cesko-Slovenska Republikanska Mladez [Czecho-Slovak Republican Youth]

Czecho-Slovak Republican Youth is a liberal-democratic youth movement based on the historical and cultural legacy of humanism, Christianity and the Enlightenment. It operates on the belief that the work ethic and creative initiative of Czechoslovakia's free citizens offers a genuine prospect for our becoming, within a reasonable span of time, equal members of the family of advanced European countries. Its slogan is "Initiative, Creativity, Enterprise" in all spheres of life. Those interested in working in the movement can obtain information from the following phone numbers: 664-30, 332-751,2 in Bratislava; 338-70 in Zilina; 232-5545 in Prague.

#### Demokraticka Mladez Slovenska [Democratic Youth of Slovakia]

Just as the Democratic Party is a center party, so will the Democratic Youth of Slovakia [DMS] endeavor to strengthen the center's forces so that everyone may have a chance but no one can usurp power permanently. DMS is an organization of democratically thinking young people. Its activities are based on the foundation of national consciousness and are in the spirit of European cultural traditions deriving from the ideas of antiquity and Christianity.

We are not hiding the fact that we are not apolitical. Everyone has his opinion, no one can be impartial. The three basic trends in our work are democratic, national and ecological—that's how Jozef Bielik, a member of the DMS Preparatory Committee, began his explanation. He said that our society does not need only to be criticized, but also we should know what we want to build up in order to avoid needless errors. We also look to organizations abroad which share similar goals for our models.

The young democrats expect the entire movement to grow from below, for instance by setting up local DMS clubs. Each person should become engaged to the extent of his own inner needs. DMS membership is open to all professing the ideas of democracy and freedom, recognizing the principle of respect for minority rights and opposing totalitarianism in any form. The proposed age bracket for DMS is 14 to 30 years.

In working toward its objectives, DMS will cooperate programmatically with the Democratic Party, the Slovak Foundation, the Stur Society, and the Standing Conference of Slovak Democratic Exiles, as well as with democratic youth organizations here and abroad.

Comments and suggestions are accepted and information, assistance and support offered by: Democratic Youth of Slovakia, Safarik Square 4, 811 02 Bratislava.

### **Junak [Boy Scouts]**

Until now the Scout movement had not done well in our country, [except for] a few years during the First Republic, a while after World War II, and a few moments following the Prague Spring. And in between the totalitarian boot—one fascist, twice Communist. "Once a scout—forever a scout" is the saying that is still true and explains in a few words why for instance today's highest Boy Scout official in the CSSR, the doctor Ivan Jancek of Zilina, carries three-score and ten years on his youthful frame....

Scouting, "invented" by Messrs Robert B. Powell and Ernest T. Seton (the naturalist and writer), originally had the mission of imparting a harmonious well-rounded education to young people. Scouting's attractiveness and its main source—the uncompromising emphasis on genuine human values—put the Boy Scout movement at the top of the list of those to be disposed of whenever any totalitarian power became entrenched. This is because no totalitarian power needs well-rounded individuals, much less those who do their own thinking. Moreover, the fascists found unacceptable one of scouting's main principles: the scout loves his country, the Czechoslovak Republic....

During the Communist totalitarian rule, the Scouts proved their vitality over others by the fact that the organization never ceased to exist. Scouts operated illegally for instance under various firemen's clubs and associations.

For a scout, honor means everything. He is faithful and loyal, considers himself a brother and friend of all people of good will. He is courteous and helps others. Of great importance for the future may well be the principle that a scout protects nature and man's valuable creations.

There are two important requirements for admission to the world scout movement: an absolute economic and political independence. Though outwardly difficult, for the Scouts this is no problem: it needs no extensive apparatus, meeting or convention halls. The Scouts' home is nature. This was expressed beautifully by Dr. Ivan Jancek in an interview carried by SMENA: "To those potentially interested in scouting we can promise nothing. They will get nothing from us. More precisely, nothing of the material kind. And for what will enrich their inner world they will have to pass tests of their willingness to sacrifice, of character, their spiritual as well as physical maturity."

In spite of the great interest which has led many since November to knock on the doors of all Boy Scout officials, it is necessary to emphasize that the Scouts is by no means a mass organization. The reason is in its demands which were outlined above in all their aspects. A scout who has the ambition to acquire a higher rank,

earn his eagle feathers, or by the age of 14 or 15 become the leader of a small troop of younger children, must possess all of the aforementioned moral qualities along with a high sense of responsibility.

Yet despite the demands it is certainly worthwhile. The contact address for those in Slovakia who may be interested is: Eng. Igor Janota, Kycerskeho 3, 811 05 Bratislava.

[By Lubo Lazovy]

### **Krestansko-Democraticka Mladez Slovenska [Christian Democratic Youth of Slovakia]**

Young people practicing Christ's gospel never stood aside from the social events in our country. Long before the Velvet Revolution their communities formed small islands of freedom in the totalitarian regime. By their participation in religious demonstrations, they clearly expressed their desire for freedom, democracy and justice. Currently, they too want to engage themselves actively in the democratic transformation of our society. Thus, within the Christian Democratic movement we have formed an autonomous movement—Christian Democratic Youth clubs. We are not building something new; we are trying to follow up on the extensive activities of Christian youth and children's communities which have existed for decades but only lately are emerging from illegality. We want to cooperate closely with all organizations and movements professing similar goals, for instance the Red Cross, the Slovak Foundation, the Boy Scouts, and so on. We will establish contacts with youth organizations all over the world, especially with the communities of our countrymen abroad. In our activity we will proceed from Christian moral and ethical values which we regard as a unifying bond among all people of good will. We want to adhere to the principles of tolerance, respect for the opinion of all, equality of all people regardless of race, nationality, religious faith or political affiliation. We will support charity works—care of children, the sick, the abandoned, the aged. We will defend every form of life and environment, including the rights of the unborn. Among young people we also want to contribute to a renewal of the lost national consciousness and respect for the historical and cultural legacy of our ancestors in the spirit of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius. Our clubs can be formed at church communities, parishes, schools, children's and youth homes, dormitories, workplaces, localities, and so on. We want to develop the clubs' activities especially to organize youth meetings of a spiritual nature, establishment of libraries, videotheques, periodicals, arranging lectures and discussions, sports events, entertainment, theater performances, musical groups, work with children, charity work, and so on. The bylaws and program of the clubs will be adopted at an all-Slovak meeting of club representatives and published in the press.

[By Jozef Miklosko]



### **Mladi Socialni Demokrati [Young Social Democrats]**

Improvement of the social conditions for students, working youth and young families is going to be the goal of the section of Young Social Democrats. This informal federal association will operate throughout the republic, while the content of the section's work will respond to the initiative of local organizations. Young Social Democrats want to ensure improvement of the social conditions of youth, general access to education, shorter military service and a gradual demilitarization of society, increased entry wages, and objectivization of the tax system, full application of young people's abilities in practice, resolution of the housing problem and the like.

Membership is open to all who support the principles of Social Democracy and are between 15 and 30 years of age. To facilitate recordkeeping and coordination, founding lists of the local sections of Young Social Democrats showing the addresses and the number of members are to be sent to: Ivo Grycz, J. Ponicaná 5, 841 07 Bratislava.

### **Pionier [Pioneer]**

Although an autonomous social organization of children and their older friends under the name of Pioneer was established already in January, to this date it has not been registered by the CSSR Federal Ministry of the Interior. The reason is unspecified partial deficiencies in documentation. The deadline for registration is 60 days, so it may be that this organization will soon find itself within the purview of the law.

It is evident to everyone that Pioneer is the successor to the Pioneer organization of the Slovak Association of Youth [SZM] and wishes to draw on the traditions of the Pioneer movement and the experience of children's organizations here as well as abroad. But it wants to shed the formalistic style, involuntary mass character, and all the unpopular phenomena of the past. What are its basic goals and visible differences from the past?

—Pioneer will base itself on the international convention on children's rights which has not yet been ratified by our government, but we hope will soon be. It will be an autonomous organization independent of any political party. Its activities will derive primarily from children's interests; it will seek to offer them the best possible utilization of their spare time—but so that the children themselves will have the decisive say about it. The children are to be the principal movers of activity; the leaders should merely assist them. Greater autonomy and powers will devolve on pioneer troops and sections. And one more essential difference—Pioneer members will also include adult pioneer workers. The above was explained by Vladimír Petrus, chairman of the Slovak Preparatory Council of Pioneer.

The greater room for children's autonomy should be reflected in the role of the pioneer aktivs, their representation in the leadership of the pioneer groups, but also in

inviting children to the most important meetings—the conferences. All of Pioneer's activity will be devoted solely to the benefit of children. It will educate them in the spirit of the democratic traditions of our nations, of morality, humanitarianism and patriotism. Pioneer will offer children a variety of interests, games and contests, active rest after school work, and this without exception to all who will want to work in Pioneer. It will lead them toward fellowship, decency, diligence in work, nature protection and respect for all cultural values. Membership is open to children, juveniles as well as adults.

[By Svetlana Kolesarova]

### **Slovenska Jednota Stredoskolakov [Slovak Union of Secondary School Students] [SJS]**

SJS is an independent voluntary apolitical organization based on democratic principles. It is a status-based organization uniting secondary school students and having as its purpose the defense of their rights and needs. This is the basic information which was discussed at the constituent assembly of the Slovak Union of Secondary School Students. As the first regular SJS assembly is not meeting until 7 March, there was agreement in the preparatory committee on certain amendments to the bylaws under discussion.

—At the founding assembly there was debate on the proper concept of SJS membership. We thought originally that each secondary school student will automatically become a member of the union upon reaching the secondary school level. But this has not met with agreement and so we amended the original intent, as Peter Kollar, member of the preparatory committee, explained in the newly acquired large but empty rooms on Nalepkova Street in Bratislava. At secondary schools [he continued] there will be established a kind of a parliament—a school council composed of representatives from each class. And they will elect from among themselves a student council of the most active ones who will be SJS members. They will receive identification cards authorizing them to speak on behalf of the students to the school authorities. But they will protect the interests and rights of all the school's students. Those who want to become SJS members must support their desire by great activism.

The coordinating center of the school councils will be Mozog SJS [SJS Brain] located in Bratislava, which will ensure communication between the school councils and the MSMaTV SSR [Slovak Socialist Republic Ministry of Education and Physical Training]. The Slovak Union of Secondary School Students plans to issue a monthly for youth titled SALTO. In discussions with the Education Ministry members of the preparatory committee are seeking to obtain statutory inclusion of the role of school councils in the new education law. For the time being their activity is being tested in three model schools—SOU BEZ [State Vocational Training School at Bratislava Electrical Engineering Works] J. Jonasa, SPSE [State Industrial School] K. Adlera, and the Bratislava

Conservatory. The exact form of SJS activity should be finally determined at the first regular convention. Until that time all secondary school students have an opportunity to think about it and share their view at the SJS address: Nalepkova 8, 811 01 Bratislava, phone no 335 914.

#### **Slovensky Vysokoskolsky Spolok [Slovak University Association]**

Many of you may already have heard or read about the Slovak University Association [SVS]. For those who as yet know nothing about the SVS (as also all supporters and associates) I want to give a picture of the activities of this voluntary social organization forming itself at Slovakia's universities.

SVS was born in the course of the Velvet Revolution in December 1989 as the successor organization to the former monopolistic Socialist Youth Association at the universities (as was also confirmed by the second part of the Association's congress).

It is an autonomous organization whose main goal is to develop student-related and international activities, meaning utilization of spare time for the benefit of personality growth of the individual as well as the collective.

If we were conducting a dialogue you would probably ask: "What is then the main content of SVS activity, what is its structure and how does it differ from the University Union of Slovakia?"

Let's begin with structure. It is very simple, two-tiered. At a faculty a faculty association is formed (it must have a minimum of five members), which elects from its midst a faculty council. Students themselves decide on the number of the council's members and the association's activities. The second tier is the center to which each faculty association sends its delegate. In our view the difference from the University Union of Slovakia lies primarily in the simple structure, the base collectives deciding on what they want to do, and the chance for them to be enterprising.

Let us now return to SVS activities. We see the main one in the area of interest in the arts. Many young people are lacking in their attitude toward the arts, particularly of the creative kind, toward national traditions. Thus we believe that if in 1965 there was initiated a competition in artistic creativity for university students as one of the forms of developing ZUC, we should and want to continue in organizing youth contests, as Academic Presov, Academic Zvolen, Academic Zilina or Banská Bystrica, as well as Programiada. We are finding support also from the Ministry of Education, Youth and Physical Culture. We also want to return to organizing student Maiales feasts and other similar undertakings which would reflect the traditions of the Slovak nation and return to us, the young people, our national pride. And since students always suffered from lack of funds, we now make an offer to them. Individuals and collectives wishing to improve their financial situation can obtain

through us job opportunities, during the entire school year and the main summer vacation, throughout the whole CSSR. All it needs is a phone call or a written application.

We are establishing initial contacts with youth organizations abroad. As to our negotiations in England and soon in Greece, we will inform all students interested in student exchanges within the next week, regardless of whether the students are organized. This much about contacts abroad.

As far as foreign students in our country are concerned, they may also become members of faculty organizations, or form their own associations corresponding to their national traditions.

So this is about how we would characterize our organizational and principal activities. You ask: Where can one get more detailed information? The address is: Slovak University Association, Prazska 11, 815 73 Bratislava, tel 465 66 (351 193). We will distribute SVS membership cards through faculty councils starting 26 February 1990.

[By Anna Kesanova]

#### **Strom Zivota [Tree of Life]**

Those who have acquired some familiarity with this movement marvel how it is possible that a largely sensible, useful and mass (without any coercive torture) movement could prosper solidly under the Socialist Youth Union [SZM]. One had to look below the surface to find that only one part of the movement—the Tree of Life competition—has roots imbedded in the main trunk of SZM. The camps, the foundation and base of the Tree of Life began to be organized by the young friends of the environment much earlier than the SZM formulated the principles of the competition, before SZM acquired official stationery and an emblem. The veterans recall that it was (according to some) in the vicinity of Cierny Balog when the little railroad still represented a burden for the state and the issue was not yet won, or (according to others) it was still earlier, somewhere in the Prievidza okres.

But that really is not of the essence.

Yet one positive factor remains from the aforementioned stories. The Tree of Life movement, today autonomous and standing next to the Youth Union as an equal partner, has no serious problem with scraping off the lime-encrusted sediment of normalization. By detour let's come back to the original idea and add only that it was precisely for this reason that Tree of Life was even during the totalitarian regime interesting, sought after and revered by experts.

Today's Tree of Life Movement is an independent, voluntary avocational organization with membership open to those 16 years of age or above. Its bylaws state as the main goal education of youth toward a healthy life style, mutual tolerance and humanitarianism—and all of this in a healthy environment. The basic legal unit of the

movement is the Club of the Tree of Life Movement which is formed when at least five members of the movement request its registration in the Coordinating Center of the Tree of Life Movement (HSZ), Prazska 11, 815 73 Bratislava, tel (07) 484 73.

Leafing through a document titled "Platform of the Tree of Life Movement" one finds that where healthy environment is concerned, Tree of Life is not just after cleaning up wells, brooks or forests. Nor does the movement want to concentrate exclusively on liquidating the barbaric "development" of society. Work on the renewal of nature's values gives the Tree of Life a moral right to have a say on public projects, that is, a say in public management. One of the recent initiatives of this kind was the strongly negative position Tree of Life took in regard to the plans to colonize and devastate the Chopek area for the stated purpose of establishing tourist facilities.

"Among our rights as well as duties is development of the national culture," it says in point 4 of the Platform. And these are no empty words. Tree of Life is entering the third year of camps in the womb of the emerging Museum of Slovak Village in the Jahodnice Forest near Martin. The dominant ethnographic feature of these camps will be complemented in 1990 by a memorable program—a school of folk crafts and arts.

Similarly as Czechoslovakia, Tree of Life Movement belongs to Europe. Czechoslovakia began to talk about it freely only after 17 November; Tree of Life undertook its first effort as early as in the summer of 1989. By circumstance it was again in Martin when, in an emerging scenario, Tree of Life arranged an Intercamp with participation (albeit sparse and rather unrepresentative) from abroad: Scotland, the USSR, West Berlin, the GDR, ... CSR. Conscious of its place in Europe and especially of the fact that environment refuses to respect borders, Tree of Life acquires a much larger scope; if it manages to take shape as an active and expert movement, it may in cooperation with environmentalist initiatives in the neighboring countries gain a respectable position, and by virtue (especially) of its authority give substantial support to endeavors designed to protect a healthy environment.

[By Lubo Lazovy]

#### **Vysokoskolska Unia Slovenska [University Union of Slovakia]**

These days the University Union of Slovakia is beginning to feel at home on Bratislava's Leskova Street, in offices which belonged to the former kraj committee of the Slovak Youth Association (SZM). Its prime movers at present are familiar faces from the November Velvet Revolution—the students Zuzana Mistrikova, Sveto Bombik and of course many others. Boris Grexa is a student at the Mathematics and Physics faculty and also at the same time at the Philosophical Faculty of Komensky University—so he knows math, physics as well as philosophy. But today he will act in the role of a guide explaining to us the goals of the university organization.

The University Union of Slovakia came into being in December of last year; it was then that official registration gave it a birth certificate. It is a republican organization of university students during their study years. Membership is open to individuals as well as collectives, either at their faculties or by application directly to Leskova Street. Boris Grexa reminded me repeatedly that the details of organizational work are still in the process of change so it would be useless to discuss them in detail; anyway, what matters is the organization's most important goal. And this is clear from the birth of the idea: ENLIVENING UNIVERSITY LIFE. An important and I believe nonnegligible aspect is the idea of the organization's economic activity directed primarily toward cultural undertakings. Much in this regard depends on activism from below; the Union would like to provide it with space and some material support. This should be arranged through certain clubs for which the Union would be both an operator and organizer; under consideration for instance is the V-club on the Slovak National Uprising [SNP] Square. Another cultural goal is space for small stage performances, exhibits of new artists. At the Mathematics-Physics Faculty of Komensky University there has been a functioning film club. It has already earned name recognition and a clientele. But it may also expand its offerings by adding a video center.

Boris Grexa illustrated the prospects for the University Union's activities by listing additional important targets: dormitories, food service, sports. Along with culture, these three concerns of university life have languished for a rather long time. Expansion of dormitories as well as cafeterias generally failed to take account of the quality of housing and food; quantity became the prime concern. So the Union is facing an unenviable task: increasing dormitory capacity but not at the expense of comfort for those living in them. Plans envisage a hotel type accommodation for which the student would receive an allotment similar to that for an apartment, which would also change his attitude toward housing. The plans also consider married students, their children in preschool care. The Union has communicated its demands for added space to the dislocation commission at the SSR Government office. It is now nervously awaiting the result.

Membership in the University Union of Slovakia is free; an accreditation card will serve as proof. At present the Union's core are the faculties in Bratislava and Nitra. The purpose of the entire operation is strong faculty organizations. The preparatory committee which is commencing its activities at Leskova Street involves about 10 people; future plans envision a full-time staff of one or two with the rest of the work provided by students themselves in their spare time. But this of course presupposes individual study plans.

[By Jarmila Horakova]

#### **Zvaz Mladych [Youth Association]**

"The Youth Association has not come into being as some kind of 'replacement' or 'successor' of the Socialist

Youth Association," demurred mildly Peter Juza, chairman of the Youth Association. "We are one of the newly founded youth organizations. Like the others we are independent, that is also of all political parties and movements, and autonomous, wishing to offer a wide spectrum of activities."

"Your platform says that you are open to all young persons but also that you are of a Left orientation..."

"I don't think this is mutually exclusive. If for instance a young believer wishes to become a member of the Youth Association no one will try to prevent him. We see the Left orientation in our desire to help the young people in resolving social questions and problems—and of these, I believe, we will have plenty in the future."

"We have heard some say that the Youth Association harbors 'old' ambitions: to become again an 'umbrella' and direct the other independent youth organizations..."

"No. What we want is merely to be a full member of an association of youth organizations in Czechoslovakia or Slovakia should such an association be established.... In my opinion it should be: primarily for economic reasons, but also from the legal point of view."

"So you don't regard yourselves as a continuation of the totalitarian SZM [Socialist Youth Association]? Many young people still have this impression..."

"No, on no account. Not the least because, as I already said, we are apolitical and independent of any political party whatever. We have no kraj sections; we want to be flexible and accentuate the activity of base units."

"What is the program you offer to the young people?"

"First of all, spare time activities—we want to make use of the potential blank spots in this area. Secondly, pressing for young people's interests for instance in relation to the power structure. Third, helping youth in resolving economic and legal problems. This concerns especially working youth, for the main reason that so far labor unions are not functioning as they should."

"How do you in the Youth Association view the current structure, the present state of affairs in the development of youth organizations in Slovakia?"

"In our opinion the issue is not what the structure will be but rather the quality of the result."

[By Lubo Lazovy]

#### **Zväz Zaujmových Zdrúžení [Association of Amateur Societies]**

The Association of Amateur Societies (ZZZ), a new nonpolitical organization, is slowly starting its activity. The ZZZ preparatory committee has already formulated the scope of its activities and outlined the means by which it seeks to attain its objectives. It will concentrate on amateur activities in the broadest sense of the word. The focus will be on four basic areas: the arts, the sports,

technical innovation, and the environment as it needs to be created and protected. It is an open organization which can be joined by any amateur collective, society or individual regardless of age. The Association of Amateur Societies does not want to supplant the organizers of the individual amateur groups but on the contrary wishes to cooperate closely with them.

What does it offer to those who may be interested? A relatively broad spectrum of services. The Association wants to represent amateur collectives in legal and social matters vis-a-vis the highest State organs, as well as the top organs in the locality where the collective carries on its activities. Furthermore, it proposes to guarantee a legal standing for all collectives and associations, offer advisory service to collectives as well as individuals, press for the establishment of a permanent stage for ZUC collectives, find sponsors, set up ecological centers and commissions for publicizing environmental problems, ensure legal and social protection for all collectives. Through the medium of a professional body, the Center for Spare Time and Services, and gradual establishment of regional branches the Association wants to involve collectives in all parts of Slovakia.

The Association of Amateur Societies will offer full agency services, thus relieving collective leaders who until now had to make all the arrangements by themselves. It will handle performances, transportation and attendance; it will seek to arrange contacts with domestic as well as foreign cultural institutions. To the extent of its ability the Association will provide stage space to amateur collectives. In cooperation with the Slovak Foundation ZZZ will establish contacts with Slovaks abroad and their organizations. The Association will also develop impresario functions. Amateur groups will be able to draw on its publicity and advertising services, since beginning with March ZZZ will have its own printing facility. The Association also plans to open its stores where its own products would be sold. For the longer term the plans are for starting a periodical publication and the establishment of a computerized information system.

## **HUNGARY**

### **Foreign Minister Horn's Three Letters to Bucharest Published**

90CH0040A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
31 Mar 90 p 6

[Commentary by Peter Vajda, and text of letters by Foreign Minister Gyula Horn: "Three Letters to Bucharest From Bem Quai"]

[Text] I owe readers an explanation with regard to publishing these letters. As is known, the Romanian foreign ministry announced during the second half of this week that "in Hungary the election campaign was used to influence Romanian-Hungarian relations, and this had a damaging effect upon developments in



Romania, making efforts for democratization and for the assurance of fundamental human and civil rights more difficult." The Bucharest foreign ministry added that it was prepared to commence substantive talks with the new Hungarian government, and announced through the Romanian embassy that "it had prepared a package plan of a constructive character, one that extends to both political relations as well as to cultural areas and other issues."

Shortly thereafter I was given an opportunity for a candid discussion with Foreign Minister Gyula Horn. He informed the various parties on that Thursday about issues concerning Hungarian-Romanian relations and the situation of Hungarians in Transylvania. In the course of our conversation I asked what the contents of the constructive Romanian package plan could be. Gyula Horn had no idea about it either: After all, he had already submitted a "package" encompassing all of our relations a few days after the December turnaround. (The minister's response to this question may be seen in the Friday issue of this newspaper). Nevertheless, this matter did not put me to rest, because the position taken by Bucharest contains a statement which deals with the responsibility of Hungarians, the grave responsibility of the present Hungarian Government, if you wish. This is why I asked the foreign ministry to release a few documents concerning the recent past of Hungarian-Romanian relations. This is how I obtained, with their help, three letters written by Gyula Horn, letters which have not been made public thus far. I am convinced that the ministry acted appropriately when it released these letters at last: The public has the right to know the truth in the situation that evolved. It may be called anything but reassuring, even though tensions have relaxed somewhat.

I do not believe that it is necessary to separately underscore anything from the message contained in the three letters. Nevertheless, I am compelled to make at least two general remarks upon reading these letters. First: Starting out from the national interest which is above parties, the foreign minister brought up matters in the most specific terms, matters that may contribute to transcending the legacy of last week. Budapest advanced proposals in which not even the faintest trace of the present territorial-geographical status quo is brought into question, but which nevertheless are not blind to the fate of Hungarians in Transylvania. (In this sense there is no return to the practice followed by the Lazar government either, and there will never be a Hungarian cabinet which even to the slightest extent would separate Hungarian-Romanian relations from the fate of Hungarians in Transylvania.) There is nothing in these proposals to violate Romanian interests. Despite this fact, from a practical standpoint, no progress has been made with respect to even a single essential issue. There is no Hungarian university, no chief consulate in Kolozsvár [Cluj], but I will not continue with the list....

The second remark: Hungarian diplomacy voiced a just concern when it brought up the issue of the operations of

hate-mongering, nationalist, anti-Hungarian, and anti-Semitic organizations. At present, our neighbor is the only country in Europe where the successor to a fascist organization—the Iron Guard—can conduct its activities without fear of legal sanctions. I, myself, felt a strong strain of fascism within the Vatra Romanesca, and as I see it, I am not alone in this regard. I am deeply disturbed by the fact that the Bucharest Government is capable of viewing this organization as its negotiating partner. The cynicism of the Vatra Romanesca men is unprecedented; their agitation amounts to an academy of incitement. Here is a quote from a radio interview given by Radu Ciontea, the organization's national chairman:

"A majority of Romanians in Transylvania fear that Transylvania will be annexed to Hungary as a result of external and internal collusion. We have information that this idea has also been supported by Hungarians residing in Transylvania, and by Hungarians who maintain contact with emigres to America. Various periodicals, maps showing historic Hungary, have begun to be circulated publicly. Statements have been made by various radio stations. Karoly Kiraly made a statement, Mr. Horn made a statement, Mr. Szuros made a statement.... And they made statements with a double meaning concerning some kind of self-determination, autonomy. Mr. Mitterand also made a statement. His statement caused outrage not only in Romania, but throughout Europe, because he brought up the border issue."

Except for the sentence concerning Mitterand, all of this could have been written by Ceausescu. One could assume that he would not have picked a fight with the state president of a country which had always provided, and continues to provide, a special place for Romania in the settlement of its Eastern relations. Incidentally, in response to a question regarding the Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures] lynch guardists' weapons, Mr. Ciontea replied that they had on them "a few traditional tools used for work." So here we have bludgeons, axes, and piercing tools as traditional tools used for work.

It is not surprising that the need spelled out in Horn's letter—to stop the forces of hatred—has thus far fallen upon deaf ears. As far as the events are concerned, competent factors in the government hold Hungarians in Hungary and in Transylvania responsible, just as the Vatra Romanesca does. There is no difference between the two in this regard, and I stress "in this regard." According to the most authoritative personality in government, the 10,000 Hungarians who crossed over to Transylvania to celebrate 15 March are to be blamed for the Marosvasarhely events; word for word, the Vatra Romanesca has the same to say.

Thereafter, there remains a single matter one ought to wonder about, and another matter one should not. The matter I wonder about is the discretion—I find no better term—of the West European echo to all the things for which the post-December turnaround Romanian leadership is responsible. Not only in the press, but also as part

of diplomatic discourse, one hears statements saying that an "ethnic conflict" is at issue, that "the truth is somewhere in the middle," etc., etc. But after objectively weighing the fundamental facts, it is entirely apparent: Human rights are at issue, the most fundamental human rights, the ones which hold that everyone may live freely on the land where he was born, that everyone may learn his language, and that he may speak, study, teach, and preach in that language. A nation lives in its language, after all. And the matter I wonder about now is whether the wave of refugees from Romania will continue, and from my standpoint this is the most painful lesson learned from the truth of the Hungarian position, also conveyed in the letters. But, unlike before, at present the new arrivals are almost exclusively Hungarians. One wonders whether the Romanian leadership will have sufficient courage to take a stand against nationalism that appeals to blind instinct, and establish conditions that do not prompt people to escape from their homes.

#### First Letter: Reconciliation

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister!

At our 29 December meeting we reached an agreement in principle to the effect that the Romanian party would take specific steps, and that in cooperation with the Hungarian party it would do everything in the interest of liquidating the immeasurable damage caused to Hungarians in Romania and to Hungarian-Romanian relations by the earlier Romanian nationalistic policy.

We also agreed that restoring the rights of Hungarians in Romania, and the manner in which their fate evolves, is the definitive element of Hungarian-Romanian relations.

I am reminding you, Mr. Minister, that, within the limits of available opportunities, ever since the first day of the revolutionary uprising, Hungarian society and the political leadership has provided, and continues to provide, all political and material support to the Romanian people for them to accomplish democratic evolution.

In light of the above, the Hungarian party is incapable of understanding phenomena that are totally different from high-level statements made and positions taken by high level Romanian political circles, such as the fact that the Romanian language communique issued with regard to my visit in Bucharest did not contain a single word about Hungarians in Romania.

I must regard as an extremely unfavorable development the fact that, contrary to numerous agreements in principle reached with you and with the highest ranking Romanian leadership, the Romanian delegation arrived at the 18-19 January meeting of the expert committee we jointly established without any substantive authority, that it continued to manifest the silent conduct which is well-known from earlier days, and that the delegation's activities were limited exclusively to agreeing to convey the specific proposals advanced by Hungary. It is unfortunate that the Romanian delegation did not manifest a

preparedness to reach agreements with regard to matters which would not have incurred financial sacrifice for the Romanian party, matters that would have been the sole functions of political decisions. I would mention here separately the reopening of the chief consulate in Kolozsvár, a matter that was supported without reservation by head of state Iliescu during my visit.

Based on the above, I must establish the fact that there appears to be a significant difference between high-level Romanian statements on the one hand, and actual intent to cooperate, on the other. As far as I am concerned, I closely relate this difference to the Bucharest foreign ministry and the Budapest Romanian embassy apparatuses that deal with Hungarian affairs, both of which were left untouched.

I am confident in your effective actions and in your personal involvement, so that specific achievements will manifest themselves as a result of the agreements in principle reached at our meeting, one that was regarded as having historical significance. Mr. Minister, I would like to call your attention to the fact that if results fail to materialize, political statements regarding new foundations upon which Hungarian-Romanian relations are based and about reconciliation between the two peoples will soon lose their value in the eyes of Hungarian, Romanian, and international public opinion. The increased expectations held by the Hungarian public make it necessary for the Hungarian leadership to publicize progress made in normalizing Hungarian-Romanian relations at the earliest possible date.

Budapest, 23 January 1990

#### Second Letter: Package Plan

Dear Mr. Minister!

I was satisfied to learn of your decision regarding the opening of the Kolozsvár chief consulate and the Hungarian House of Culture in Bucharest. This step mitigates the damage caused to Hungarians in Romania and to Hungarian-Romanian relations by the nationalistic policies of the Ceausescu regime.

I hope that you will treat the remainder of the proposals we advanced at the Budapest meeting of experts in a similar manner. My belief that the realization of these proposals is an indispensable condition for placing relations on new foundations is unchanged.

Our delegates are prepared to travel on location at the earliest possible date to discuss specific issues with authorities having jurisdiction in Kolozsvár, and with representatives of the Romanian foreign ministry, concerning the reopening of the chief consulate. On a temporary basis we regard the previous building (Zrinyi Street) as appropriate, but, as we have indicated through official channels, we are counting on the possibility that the chief consulate may move to Racovita Street, the location it occupied decades ago.



I presume that the indication in your letter concerning the level of representation in Kolozsvár and Debrecen was in error. We have been talking about chief consulates thus far, and consider it natural for the renewed operations to continue at the same level, even after the arbitrary suspension of operations that took place in 1988. This is consistent with the memorandum of agreement reached on 16 June 1977.

Accordingly, in our interpretation, Domokos Vekas, the chief consul of the Hungarian Republic in Kolozsvár may continue to function unimpeded.

I will note here that the Kolozsvár chief consulate has pursued its activities at all times in a manner consistent with the 1963 Vienna consular agreement and the requirements established in Hungarian-Romanian agreements in force. The chief consulate will continue to fully respect these agreements in the course of its future work.

As a matter related to the reopening of the Hungarian chief consulate in Kolozsvár, I recommend that we begin negotiations concerning the opening of sub-consulates in Temesvár [Timisoara] and in Brasso [Brasov], or in other jointly agreed-upon cities which enhance Hungarian-Romanian relations directly at the people's level, as soon as possible.

I would like to remind you that the Hungarian party has made an earlier proposal concerning a simultaneous settlement of all pending financial issues and the matter of all disputed diplomatic real estate in the form of a "package plan." Our proposal was agreed to by representatives of the Romanian foreign ministry, and based on this we have already designated our expert committee. We are prepared to conduct substantive negotiations in hopes that petty points of view will not postpone resolution of these issues.

I am taking this opportunity to call your attention to the fact that the Hungarian public is concerned about the strongly swelling waves of Romanian nationalism and about the incitement of anti-Hungarian sentiments. We were shocked to learn about pamphlets which demand the denial of just demands by Hungarians in Romania, about charges concerning anti-Romanian atrocities, and, in the wake of these, about organized anti-minority demonstrations, and the charge claiming that separatist endeavors exist. We are surprised to see that prominent representatives of the Ceausescu era have appeared on the scene, and that they enjoy publishing opportunities. I trust that the new Romanian leadership is prepared to do everything possible to disarm those who scheme against a Hungarian-Romanian agreement, to stand up against those who incite nationalistic passions. A firm position taken by the Romanian leadership in this specific issue, based on convincing proof, would manifest your determination and your frequently declared preparedness.

Our public opinion observes with concern the dispute over restoring the former school system and other institutions of Hungarians in Romania. I consider it important that these problems be resolved at the earliest possible date, and I am

reiterating our preparedness to provide support in a manner and form you feel is appropriate.

Mr. Foreign Minister! If necessary, we are prepared to once again transfer to you the proposed statement concerning cooperation with regard to nationalities. I recommend that you once again consider our proposal, and that we formulate, on the basis of joint thinking, the concepts that pertain to the role and place to be played and filled by nationalities in our relations. I am convinced that this would be consistent with the actual interests of our two countries, and would also represent a model undertaking on a European scale. Since, to our pleasure and to the satisfaction of Europe, Romania has withdrawn its reservations related to the closing document of the Vienna EBEE [not further expanded] meeting, I do not see an impediment in principle to enforcing a democratic, modern outlook on nationalities in our bilateral relations.

Mr. Minister!

I personally feel that our consultations thus far have proven that we are following the correct path: The difficulties caused by the Romanian dictatorship may be resolved through open, candid dialogue, and mutual good intentions. In this spirit I find it necessary to note that adding qualifying statements to each others' positions and styles of negotiation, and the making of superfluous assumptions do not serve the common cause. I trust that in the future we will be able to take further steps on the path we have embarked upon, by avoiding such statements and by manifesting constructive conduct and objectivity.

Budapest, 2 February 1990

### Third Letter: Tolerance

Dear Mr. Minister!

From the Hungarian standpoint I attribute great significance to the need for responsible dialogue between the leaders of the two countries to be continuous, and for such dialogue to be sustained under any circumstances. This is in the fundamental interest of both countries. On my part I regard as useful the meetings and exchange of correspondence with you, a matter that by now is becoming a regular phenomenon; however, the mutual intentions to place our relations on new foundations are not being followed by appropriate actions.

The Hungarian leadership and society are aware of the present, difficult situation in Romania. We recognize and sense the efforts being made by the leadership. Despite all this, however, I regret to find that regarding the placing of Hungarian-Romanian relations on new foundations, the Romanian party has delayed on several issues, the resolution of which would not involve financial sacrifice on the Romanian side. All it would take to resolve these issues is political determination and will. In the course of my visit to Bucharest I made a number of specific proposals in the interest of normalizing our

relations. A majority of these proposals remained without substantive response from the Romanian side. Thus far you have not reverted to several Romanian promises made at the Budapest negotiations of foreign policy experts in January (consultations for the review of agreements in force, the initiation of regularly scheduled bus routes, the establishment of relay stations for the reception of Hungarian television programs, the pending financial issues related to leased real estate, expert negotiations regarding refugee matters, revocation of the expulsion of former Bucharest commercial counselor Karoly Györfi, etc.).

We value the fact that the Romanian party has not established conditions for renewing the activities of the Bucharest Hungarian cultural house, and of the chief consulate in Kolozsvár. Following conciliatory negotiations by Hungarian and Romanian professionals in Kolozsvár between 5 and 8 February, we still have not received a response to the announced Hungarian wishes, even though a response was promised to be forthcoming within a few days. In light of facts which prove successive Romanian delays, we are unable to accept Romanian statements which accuse the Hungarian party of being impatient. Based also on your promises made in Ottawa, we anticipate and urge that the Romanian party provide a response at the earliest possible date concerning the existence of necessary conditions for the operations of the chief consulate.

On every occasion in the course of bilateral discussions the Romanian political leadership promised that it would make determined efforts to secure the rights of Hungarians in Romania, and to establish the institutional system that is indispensable for the exercise of such rights. And at our last meeting I stressed in my statements to you that without these, Hungarian-Romanian relations cannot be settled either. Based on news reports that have appeared in the Romanian press and on other information, we are observing with growing anxiety that after a promising start the fulfillment of the just claims of national minorities has come to a halt, moreover, in certain instances, some backward steps have been taken. It is in the common interest to halt this unfavorable process. As a first step in this direction it would be useful for Hungarian and Romanian experts well versed in this subject matter to exchange views as to how these concerns could be resolved. Accordingly, I recommend that a working group composed of five-six experts commence an exchange of views, with coordination provided by the two foreign ministries.

Mr. Foreign Minister!

In our view, following the revolution there suddenly arose an opportunity for an approach between the two nations, for reconciliation between the two countries. Overall, a favorable atmosphere evolved to accomplish this. But the increasing number of negative phenomena during the past weeks have raised just concern in the Hungarian public which watches the changes in Romania. These negative phenomena have peaked with regard to the matter of

separating schools. Publications, pamphlets, writings on the wall, and speeches which rekindle the spirit of the bygone era have multiplied, and personnel changes which could be regarded as retorts are being made. The enemies of democratic transformation have toppled bilingual designations in nationality settlements such as in Marosvásárhely, and minorities, Hungarians, Jews, and others have been severely harmed. Statements by Romanian government officials and politicians in Romania and abroad have caused consternation, and awakened doubts about the sincerity of Romanian political intentions. A statement issued by the Ministry of Education which attributes a hostile character to a book drive in Hungary and questions the selfless nature of its intent while the drive was organized spontaneously with an intent to help, serves only to increase anti-Hungarian passions. This outrages the Hungarian public.

Aware of all these, and other facts not mentioned here, we express concern when we establish the fact that political organizations and persons who openly proclaim anti-Hungarian policies, and who act accordingly, are increasingly gaining ground in Romanian public life. These forces are interested in rekindling the hatred that was also nourished by the Romanian dictatorship. For this reason they make unfounded accusations with regard to Hungarians and other minorities. I would like to remind you that in days laden with threats to the Romanian people, the Hungarian people rushed to assist the citizens of Romania without establishing conditions. From a practical standpoint, with their sacrifice and self-sacrificing conduct the Hungarian people voted for reconciliation.

We regret to recognize that to this date the Romanian leadership has not found an opportunity to take a public stand against anti-Hungarian manifestations, and to stand up against the forces of darkness well known from history by pursuing firm, consistent policies. We trust, nevertheless, that the Romanian leadership will have enough strength to support its earlier promises with actions, and that they will reassure the concerned Hungarian public by showing specific results. Now, more than ever, there is a need to calm passions, to establish an atmosphere of patience and tolerance, and to take actions that give credibility to words. We are convinced that normalizing Hungarian-Romanian relations cannot be delayed because of the transcending significance of the region [as published]. On the other hand, such relations may be placed on durable foundations only if settlement is reached according to European standards.

Budapest, 2 March 1990

**Otto Habsburg on Mindszenty, Pan-European Union**  
90CH0025A Budapest MAGYARORSZAG  
in Hungarian 9 Feb 90 p 19

[Interview with Otto von Habsburg, by Katalin Reviczky, place and date not given: "The Mindszenty Case: Witness Testimony—Otto Habsburg at the Prosecutor's Office"]

[Text] The Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor is conducting an investigation of the need to order a new trial, to

review the criminal proceeding that was conducted against Jozsef Mindszenty and his associates. The purpose of the investigation is to determine whether Jozsef Mindszenty was guilty or innocent, and whether 40 years ago (8 February 1949) the former prince primate was convicted in accordance with the law.

This issue came to the attention of the greater public when state minister Imre Pozsgay announced during his visit to the Vatican in late March 1989 that the review of conceptual trials conducted between 1945 and 1962 would most certainly include criminal proceedings against church personalities, including those conducted against then Prince Primate Jozsef Mindszenty and his associates. Shortly thereafter, in early April, a Mindszenty Memorial Committee was formed within the Hungarian Independence Party. It established as its goal the rehabilitation of the cardinal.

#### New Trial

A study of the court docket and related documents, including relevant resolutions brought by the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party [MDP], began late last year at the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor. The study is being directed by prosecuting group leader Dr. Tibor Balassa, and is being supervised by Deputy Supreme State Prosecutor Dr. Sandor Nyiri.

A number of witnesses testified regarding the case. The docket shows that one of the most important charges filed against Mindszenty was that his goal was the overthrow of the people's republic and the restoration of the kingdom, notably the restoration to power of the Habsburg Dynasty's heir apparent. Therefore, the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor asked Dr. Otto Habsburg, the descendant of the Habsburg Dynasty and a politician who plays a significant role in European politics, to testify as part of the investigation related to the new trial, thus assisting Hungarian authorities in their work. Otto Habsburg gladly complied with the request. An opportunity to hear Otto Habsburg's witness testimony arose when the Hungarian Society of the International Pan-European Union held its organizational meeting last weekend. Otto Habsburg, chairman of the Pan-European body, came to Budapest and reported on the organization's goals at a press conference. He then proceeded to deliver a speech that afternoon about Hungary's relations with Europe in response to an invitation received from the Comenius Teaching Academy of Sarospatak.

Otto Habsburg testified in regard to the Mindszenty case under discrete circumstances, with the public excluded. Just how much could we learn about this event? (As can be seen from the photographs, Otto Habsburg agreed not only to our taking pictures, but also to our publishing them. [photographs not included in translation] We take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the highly respected politician for his courtesy. This is not the first time he has appeared in Hungary. This newspaper's chief

editor, Janos Juhani Nagy, was the first Hungarian journalist to interview Otto Habsburg on the occasion of a dinner ceremony.) Considering the politician's busy schedule and the brief time available, the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor proceeded with great circumspection. According to the information we received, the day before Otto Habsburg was heard they provided the politician with an audio tape so that he could learn the most important details of the Mindszenty case, testimony in which Otto Habsburg's name is mentioned. These "chapters" are contained in the testimony of Mindszenty and his secretary, Dr. Andras Zakar. Anyone who has read the transcript of the proceedings that was published at that time, or a transcript that has been published since, will certainly remember details which also served to criminally implicate Otto Habsburg.

With regard to the above, the most important items contained in the documents are as follows:

- A meeting and conversation with the junior Marquis Pallavicini. He was a supporter of Hungarian legitimist endeavors, and conveyed messages between Jozsef Mindszenty, Jusztin Baranyai, and Otto Habsburg, according to court documents.
- A July 1947 Chicago meeting with Mindszenty. The former prince primate appeared on a speaking tour at that time. The possibility of a planned federated monarchy, and a possible Austro-Hungarian personal union, was discussed at that meeting. Furthermore, they discussed the opportunities available to and the activities of a Hungarian legitimist movement or organization.
- According to the court documents, Mindszenty was also charged with having written a letter to Otto Habsburg, authorizing him to represent Hungarian Catholics abroad. According to the charges of those days the prince primate forwarded this letter to Otto Habsburg by way of American Cardinal Spellman. A contradiction had to be clarified in the course of testimony provided to the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor. This contradiction emerged as a result of the fact that a statement made by Otto Habsburg was read at the trial. In it he claimed that he had not met with Mindszenty.

#### Mindszenty Square in Esztergom

Accordingly, these were the most important issues Otto Habsburg was to testify on so that the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor could clarify the important elements of the Mindszenty case, and formulate judgment concerning the legality of the case and its conceptual character. Clarification of the case was also followed with great attention at the palace of the Esztergom archbishopric. Otto Habsburg's Monday testimony obviously made no small contribution to the decision at the palace of the archbishopric to name the Esztergom Palace Square after Jozsef Mindszenty.

On Monday, the MAGYARORSZAG reporter asked Otto Habsburg about the hearing at the prosecutor's office, and requested a statement concerning the details of the case.

[Habsburg] I will not make a statement concerning the details of the case because I was requested to treat this matter as confidential.

[MAGYARORSZAG] Could you still say something about the relationship between you and Jozsef Mindszenty? Are the charges contained in the suit and the judgments resulting from those charges valid?

[Habsburg] I can say as much as I answered to questions questions raised at the prosecutor's office: I knew the prince primate, I frequently met with him, and I regard him as one of the great Hungarian personalities of this century. Incidentally, the prince primate never dealt with the issue of restoration. He wanted to find ways in which his country could receive foreign assistance. He was a courageous man, ahead of his times, one who was able to say "no." Accordingly I welcome any endeavor which aims to clear his name.

[MAGYARORSZAG] As long as you are unable to provide more detailed information in this regard, let us perhaps discuss the other purpose of your visit: the establishment of the Hungarian branch of the International Pan-European Union. You appeared at the Budapest events as one of the reorganizers of this movement.

[Habsburg] Paneuropa ist ganz Europa! This is our watchword. In Hungarian it means: "We choose Europe as a whole!" Representatives of our movement were present at a late summer picnic organized near Sopron, at which a decisive change was initiated, not only in the relationship of the two German states but also in the relationship of Europe as a whole, documenting Hungary's perception with regard to human rights. We may include here the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, as well as the practical assistance provided to Hungarians in Transylvania. All of us agree with the words of Francois Mitterand. In a speech he delivered on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution he said: "Let the European Bastilles collapse, at last."

[MAGYARORSZAG] There are some, and not just a few, who narrow down the character of the Pan-European movement to a European character based on a Christian outlook and a Christian order of values.

[Habsburg] These fears are unfounded. In this conjunction I would make reference to the historical roots of the Christian religion, the fact that the Pan-European movement is not confessionalist [as published], but stands on the foundations of ecumenism. It professes a historic dialogue with the Jewish religion, and also with the tolerant representatives of Islam, because as "God's creations, Christians do not recognize either states or races, social classes or ruling collectives. They recognize only the freedom of the individual."

### He Will Not Be a Candidate for President

This is how the politician continued the exclusive interview he granted to this newspaper:

[Habsburg] As far as I am concerned, however, the ideal of paneurope also represents a cultural orientation. Now the Hungarian movement may greatly contribute to strengthening this orientation. After all, in the Hungarian society's concept, the preservation of the Central European cultural heritage, the further development of the legacies, occupies an important place. Among the personal conditions that attend to the realization of these goals are persons in the leadership of the Hungarian movement, including professor Janos Szentagothai, movie director Peter Bokor, and, of course, the author Miklos Hubay. They provide personal guarantees that culture will play an important role in the realization of the Pan-European ideal.

[MAGYARORSZAG] Finally, we would like to ask whether you will run as a candidate for the president of the republic. Many conflicting statements have appeared lately in this regard.

[Habsburg] As the representative of the European Parliament, as one who regards himself as a Hungarian, I want to cooperate with every party that encourages democratic transformation. Nevertheless, I consider it to be my most important task to help Hungary's acceptance into the European Community. Accordingly, I do not accept the nomination.

[MAGYARORSZAG] Can you identify with the legitimist party that was established in Hungary not too long ago?

[Habsburg] No, I do not identify with that movement. Although it is true that as a member of the Christian Democratic faction of the European Parliament I have closer relations with that party, as well as with the Smallholders Party and the Democratic Forum, I support only those parties which endeavor to accomplish democratic transformation.

[MAGYARORSZAG] What is the situation with regard to your Hungarian citizenship?

[Habsburg] I have written to the Hungarian Government. I am unaware of the outcome.

### Leader of Group Investigating Mindszenty Trial Interviewed

90CH0025B Budapest MAGYARORSZAG  
in Hungarian 16 Feb 90 pp 18-19

[Interview with Dr. Tibor Balassa, leader of the prosecuting group, from the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor, by Andras Kanyo, place and date not given: "The Mindszenty Case: Fact Finding—Documents in a Metal Box; Rakosi Was Directing"]



[Text] Dr. Tibor Balassa, the leader of the prosecuting group from the Office of the Supreme State Prosecutor, is directing the review of the conceptual trial that was conducted in February 1949 against Jozsef Mindszenty and his associates. We asked him where the investigation stands, and what results the 5 February testimony of Otto Habsburg, one of the crown witnesses of the new trial process, produced.

[Balassa] A determination issued by the government provides for the review from the standpoint of the legality of the proceedings that were conducted between 1945 and 1962. The first law on reconciliation regarding the participants in the 1956 events was created in this framework. Another law on reconciliation is being prepared; the second law applies to sentences decreed prior to 1956. The government decided that it would select several exemplary cases that are worthy as models, and that the examinations of these must be accomplished individually. Performing this task is the function of the Supreme State Prosecutor's office. Some of the cases have been closed as a result of a protest issued against the legality of the action. In other cases, investigations to support new trials are in progress. The case of Jozsef Mindszenty and his associates is among these.

#### Letter to Truman

The study of the Mindszenty case required a long period of time. We received materials contained in some 70 dossiers from the Interior Ministry. These, however, were tied together according to specific Interior Ministry needs, not in accordance with the sequence followed in the proceedings, i.e. preparatory materials, investigative materials, court documents, and documents prepared thereafter. Instead, they were mixed up. Work is made more difficult by the fact that quite a few written documents are not available. Actually, the judgment was based on two pillars in the case. One was the defendants' and the witnesses' testimonies, and the other consisted of written materials, the documents found in that certain metal cylinder, the one Andras Zakar and Janos Fabian dug away in the prince primate's cellar, and which was dug out by State Security Authority [AVH] investigators on 23 December 1948. Some of the documents contained in the metal cylinder could not be found; some important documents, such as Mindszenty's letter to President Truman, in which he requested intervention in Hungarian affairs, according to the court's judgment, are missing.

[MAGYARORSZAG] Was there such a letter?

[Balassa] Presumably yes. We have one original draft of that letter. On the other hand, it also turned out that in some respects the draft that was handwritten by Mindszenty and the letter that was supposedly mailed to the addressee are not identical. I can mention one specific matter. With regard to the extradition of the sacred crown, the Mindszenty draft includes a paragraph that was not included in the English translation. This pertained to the fact that the crown should not be returned

to the Hungarian state, but should be transferred to the Vatican instead. This matter was addressed by the judgment as follows: Mindszenty endeavored to secure the crown for Otto Habsburg. Judicial council chief, Judge Vilmos Olty, read a few sentences from the letter addressed to Truman; these sentences, however, are not included in the draft. Accordingly, this is why it became necessary to attempt to acquire the documents actually delivered to the addressee. We requested help from the foreign ministry and from the church. This is a lengthy proceeding, but it cannot be avoided.

The other part of the investigation involves the search for, and receiving of, testimony from persons related to the case in any way, either as witnesses or defendants in the case, or as persons familiar with the case as a result of their official functions, or because they were officials of the AVH, the court, or the justice ministry.

[MAGYARORSZAG] Did you succeed in finding such persons and taking testimony from them?

[Balassa] Of course. From among the AVH people, Gabor Peter and Gyula Decsi are still alive, and so is the then church affairs subdivision head, the investigator who took testimony from Andras Zakar and who forced Jozsef Mindszenty to write a letter that implied escape. These people were in their thirties at the time, and 45 years have passed since. Only one member of the court is still alive: Vilmos Olty. He also testified, and we took testimony from the person who took the minutes in the case, as well as Gyula Kallai, who was a member of the upper leadership of the party in those days, and who was later appointed foreign minister. We asked him about the foreign policy impact of the case. In addition, we heard from ecclesiastic persons who were around the cardinal, or were connected to him in other ways.

[MAGYARORSZAG] Why was it necessary to summon Otto Habsburg?

#### Fourteen Questions for Otto Habsburg

[Balassa] We did not summon him. Since the court documents mention his name in the context of Mindszenty wanting to help him to the throne, and the allegation that the two discussed this matter several times, we asked him to contribute to the revelation of the truth. Let him appear at the Supreme State Prosecutor's Office and let him testify. He willingly complied with our request.

[MAGYARORSZAG] Did you approach him through official channels?

[Balassa] How should I say this.... We approached him through several official channels. I believe that it would be an objective statement if I said that approaching him did not take place in the usual way.

[MAGYARORSZAG] It was not through the Foreign Ministry or by mail?

[Balassa] It was accomplished with the intervention of official Hungarian ecclesiastic persons. I cannot say more; I have no authority to say more.

[MAGYARORSZAG] What did you do after receiving Otto Habsburg's affirmative response?

[Balassa] First of all we had to find a date which suited both him and ourselves. Once that was established, we prepared a composition of the aural record of the Mindszenty case, of the part in which Otto Habsburg's name is mentioned in the already discussed context. We forwarded this audio material to Otto Habsburg at the Hotel Gellert on 4 February. He arrived in Budapest on that day. We attached to the audio tape questions to which we wanted to receive answers.

[MAGYARORSZAG] What were those questions?

[Balassa] I do not know whether there is a way—if only for the volume of it—to enumerate the 14 questions.

[MAGYARORSZAG] It would be too much perhaps, because not just the questions, but also the answers would be interesting.

[Balassa] Let us agree that I will report some of the questions and the essence of the responses received.

[MAGYARORSZAG] Before discussing the questions, let me ask you this question: Was this a regular testimony by a witness, including the usual warning and personal identification?

[Balassa] Yes we took a regular witness testimony, as in every other case, and of course the personal identity had to be verified authentically.

[MAGYARORSZAG] Now let us see the questions.

[Balassa] One of the questions went like this: Under what circumstances did you become acquainted with Mindszenty; were you aware of his legitimist feelings?

The response to this was that they became acquainted in Chicago, in 1947, where Otto Habsburg had traveled to present a lecture, while Mindszenty had arrived in the United States from Canada. He knew of Mindszenty, and that he was a legitimist, but he also knew that "he did not take part in the political aspects of legitimist endeavors. In that field, National Assembly representatives Antal Sigray and Miklos Griger were the decisive persons."

#### Was Force Used?

Another question pertained to the fact that at the 1949 trial they reported Otto Habsburg's statement in which he said that he had not met with Mindszenty, while we know that there was such a meeting. How could one interpret the above denial, since Mindszenty himself acknowledged the fact that a meeting had taken place?

[MAGYARORSZAG] And how did he explain this contradiction?

[Balassa] This was his present answer: At the time Mindszenty was tried, they reported my statement given to the press in which I said that "I did not meet with Mindszenty. This was true in the sense that I was asked whether I met with him in Canada. I was able to respond to this in good conscience in the negative, because the meeting took place in the United States."

As we know, this meeting took place in a Chicago cloister, and no one else besides the two was present during the discussion. At this time Otto Habsburg stated that they discussed the situation of Hungary—Mindszenty informed him about that—but the possibility of an Austro-Hungarian personal union was not raised; the witness saw nothing realistic in that, although he was aware that "such a perception had come to the minds of a few American politicians."

[MAGYARORSZAG] Where does the review of the Mindszenty case stand at present?

[Balassa] We still must hear from some witnesses; those who worked on the case on behalf of the AVH, and some witnesses from the Justice Ministry will also be heard, and we are awaiting the materials to be received from the Foreign Ministry. And further, we must verify the data concerning the maltreatment and medication of the accused, for example, in matters written in the memoirs of Bela Istvanffy, the seventh defendant. Also, Mindszenty wrote about maltreatment. This is in contrast to the present witness testimony of one of Mindszenty's interrogators, according to which Rakosi issued a special instruction not to harm the defendants involved in the case because it could create a world-wide scandal if the defendants were to recount that at the trial. And as we know, the trial was open, many foreign journalists were present, and they had to count on that.

[MAGYARORSZAG] And what about the medication issue, i.e. the assumption that the defendants were drugged when they testified?

[Balassa] Well, we found one of the interpreters who worked alongside a foreign reporter. He testified that, according to his recollection, reporters generally believed that Mindszenty and others had confessed in response to violence or under the influence of medication. But in the course of the trial they dropped these assumptions particularly on the basis of the defendants' behavior. Perhaps because subsequently, even after hearing all the facts of the case, the defendants' conduct appeared to be very rational and expedient. Mindszenty, for example, did not admit his guilt, he defended himself. But since his own handwritten testimony is available, and since contradictions may be found in that testimony, some handwriting experts examine at present whether the handwriting is authentic, and whether the writing was prompted by violence or under the influence of medication. Handwriting experts are able to draw conclusions to this effect; they can even tell whether a writing occurred voluntarily or if it was dictated, because the



author can be easily recognized on the basis of his style, the way sentences are phrased.

We must also hear from medical experts, because in those days they mentioned two drugs that were used on the Mindszenty defendants. The fact is that during his arrest Mindszenty received medication because he had goitre and was in need of medication.

#### Four Variations

[MAGYARORSZAG] You are familiar with all of the trial documents. You have heard from all the witnesses who are still alive and who could be located. And even though the opinions of handwriting experts, linguists, and physicians are still to come, I will ask this question: Was there anything that could be regarded as a crime committed by Mindszenty according to either the law in force at the time, or under present law?

[Balassa] The prosecutor's office examines facts. The determination of guilt or innocence is the job of courts. At the time, the court found Mindszenty guilty. On the other hand, based on the investigation thus far, it is beyond dispute that we are dealing with a conceptual trial, constructed at the highest level by Rakosi. The summary record appears in four variations among the documents.

One of the witnesses heard in the present process said that at Rakosi's instructions Mindszenty was to be presented as the enemy. And this witness should know because he was one of the interrogators. Rakosi was informed on a daily basis; he checked the records. He made written comments in the margin of the records or on pieces of paper attached to them; on other occasions he expressed his views over the telephone. In this regard one of the witnesses testified that "... thus the practice evolved that I went to report to Gabor Peter a 0900 hours, and there I received first-hand information concerning Rakosi's intentions."

[MAGYARORSZAG] One last question. To what extent is the prosecutor's work influenced by the fact that as of recently many verbal and written statements have been made concerning the Mindszenty case?

[Balassa] We are determined that our task is limited to fact finding only. The effects of the environment are manifested by the fact that we have tried to work as fast as possible. But we are unable to influence every phase of the work. The written document we are expecting to receive from abroad, and the expert opinions, are not yet available. But I once again wish to stress that we want to find out facts, independent of what some persons want to read into those facts. [end interview]

#### "... Let There Be Martyrs"

The documentation of the Mindszenty case amounts to 70 volumes, and there are several dozens of books and studies which deal with the matter. The latter include a work published in Munich 1988 written by Gabor

Salacz: "Seventeen Years of the Hungarian Catholic Church." Part of this volume deals with the October 1947 visit by Bishop Gyula Czapik of Eger at the Vatican and his discussions with the Pope and with Cardinal Tardini. The purpose of Czapik's mission was to seek intervention by, and the good offices of the Holy See in the dispute that arose between the Hungarian Catholic Church and the state. Some of the Hungarian bishops found Mindszenty unsuitable to settle that dispute because of Mindszenty's stubborn attitude.

The author indicates that the Pope designated a person suitable for such intervention. On the other hand, Tardini adopted Mindszenty's viewpoint and said that "... it is useless to negotiate with a government which does not keep any of its promises. He did not regard the situation as tragic. In his view the communist system would collapse shortly by itself. Responding to Czapik's question as to what Tardini regarded as the proper path to follow, as to what the Hungarian bishops should do, Tardini briefly replied: Go home and become martyrs."

#### How Individual, Slate Votes Translate Into Mandates

##### Relevant Legal Provisions

25000690 Budapest MAGYAR KOZLONY in Hungarian  
30 Oct 89 pp 1305-1328

[Excerpts from Law No 34 of 1989 concerning the election of National Assembly representatives, adopted at the 20 October 1989 session of the National Assembly]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

#### Part II. The Election System

##### Chapter I. National Assembly Representatives

4.1. The total number of National Assembly representatives is 386.

4.2. In individual voting districts, 176 representatives shall be elected, and 152 in county and Budapest voting districts (hereinafter: "regional voting districts"), by slates. An additional 58 compensatory mandates shall be filled from the parties' national slates, derived from the nationwide, combined total votes cast in individual and regional voting districts which did not result in mandates.

4.3. The number of individual voting districts in the counties and in Budapest, and the number of mandates that may be acquired per regional voting district, [passage omitted] are contained in the attachment to this law.

4.4. The rights and duties of each National Assembly representative are identical. [passage omitted]

## Chapter II. Determining Election Results

7.1. In individual voting districts a candidate is elected National Assembly representative in the first round of elections if he receives more than half of the valid votes, provided that more than half of the eligible voters of the voting district cast their votes.

7.2. If in the first round of elections more than half of the voters in an election district do not cast votes (hereinafter: "invalid election round"), in the second round of elections:

a. All candidates may run who ran in the first round of elections; and

b. The candidate who receives the largest number of valid votes shall become the representative, provided that more than one quarter of the eligible voters in the district cast their votes in the election.

7.3. If in the first round of elections more than half of the eligible voters cast votes, but no candidate received more than half of the valid votes (hereinafter: "election round producing no result"), in the second round of elections:

a. Candidates who received at least 15 percent of the valid votes cast in the first round of elections may run; if there are not at least three such candidates, the three candidates who achieved the largest number of votes may run; and

b. The candidate who receives the largest number of valid votes shall become the representative, provided that more than one quarter of the eligible voters in the district cast their votes in the election.

7.4. Parties which in individual voting districts jointly nominate a candidate shall inform the election committee at least eight days prior to the elections as to the ratio in which the fractional votes they receive should be considered in tallying the national vote. [passage omitted]

8.1. In regional voting districts the candidates on party slates shall receive their mandates in the sequences that their names are listed on the ballot form, and in proportion to the votes cast, provided that more than half of the eligible voters cast votes. The proportion of the votes cast shall be calculated pursuant to the formula provided in the attachment to this law.

8.2. In the event that in a regional voting district the first round of elections is invalid because more than half of the eligible voters did not participate, all party slates which ran in the first round of elections may run in the second round of elections. Candidates appearing on party slates shall receive their mandates pursuant to the formula provided in the attachment to this law, provided that more than one quarter of the eligible voters cast their votes.

8.3. In the event that after the calculations referred to in Subparagraphs 1 and 2 unfilled mandates remain, candidates who receive fewer than, but more than two-thirds of the number of votes required for a mandate will also receive a mandate. From among several such candidates, the one who received the largest number of votes shall receive the mandate, in sequence. If after the calculations have been completed a vacant mandate remains, that mandate shall increase the number of mandates that may be acquired through the national slate.

8.4. In the event that a mandate is acquired pursuant to Subparagraph 3, the difference between the actual number of votes acquired and the number of votes needed to acquire a mandate shall be subtracted from the total, national number of fractional votes of the party which ran the candidate.

8.5. A candidate running on a regional slate shall not acquire a mandate under the conditions described in Subparagraphs 1-3 if he did not acquire more than two-thirds of the number of votes needed to acquire a mandate in the given voting district, or more than four percent of the national total number of valid votes cast for the regional slate.

8.6. Parties which announce joint slates at least eight days prior to the elections shall receive mandates in proportion to the total number of votes cast for their slates. Simultaneously with the announcement, the election committee must be informed as to what order the various candidates should receive their mandates. This statement shall be publicized by the election committee.

8.7. Parties which established joint slates in regional voting districts or which joined their slates, shall inform the election committee eight days prior to the elections at the latest of the proportion of the fractional votes remaining on a joint or joined slate that shall be considered in the national tallying of votes. [passage omitted]

9.1. Candidates on the national slates shall receive their mandates in proportion to the national total of fractional votes, and in the announced sequence. The following shall constitute fractional votes:

a. In individual voting districts, votes cast for party candidates who did not establish a mandate in either round of the elections; and

b. In regional voting districts, votes cast in the valid round of elections which were insufficient to acquire a mandate, and which exceed the number of votes needed to acquire a mandate.

9.2. Votes cast in invalid election rounds shall not constitute fractional votes pursuant to Subparagraph 1, and therefore must not be considered from the standpoint of acquiring mandates on the national slate. Votes cast for regional slates whose sponsoring party's slates totalled at the national level do not exceed four percent

of the national total of votes cast for all parties' regional states shall not be regarded as fractional votes.

9.3. Parties which announce the joining of their slates at least eight days prior to the elections shall receive mandates in proportion to the total number of fractional votes allotted to their slates. Simultaneously with the announcement, they must inform the National Election Committee [OVB] of the sequence in which individual candidates shall receive their mandates. The announcement shall be made public by the OVB. [passage omitted]

### Part III. The Election Proceeding

#### Chapter XII. Closing Provisions

52. Attachments to this law establish: [passage omitted]

b. The number of individual voting districts in the counties and in Budapest, and the number of mandates that may be acquired in each regional voting district; [passage omitted]

d. The method of calculation by which votes are to be tallied and by which the outcome of the election shall be determined; [Attachment No. 1 omitted]

Attachment No. 2 (to 52.(b))

County	Number of Individual Voting Districts	Number of Mandates That May Be Acquired Through Slates Per Regional Voting District
1. Budapest	32	28
2. Baranya	7	6
3. Bacs-Kiskun	10	8
4. Bekes	7	6
5. Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén	13	11
6. Csongrad	7	6
7. Fejér	7	6
8. Győr-Sopron	7	6
9. Hajdu-Bihar	9	8
10. Heves	6	5
11. Komárom	5	5
12. Nógrád	4	4
13. Pest	16	14
14. Somogy	6	5
15. Szabolcs-Szatmar	10	9
16. Szolnok	8	6
17. Tolna	5	4
18. Vas	5	4
19. Veszprem	7	6
20. Zala	5	5
Total	176	152

[Attachment No. 3 omitted]

Attachment No. 4 (to 52.(d))

#### Method of Calculation for Tallying Votes and Determining the Outcome of the Elections

[passage omitted]

#### II. Regional Voting Districts

[passages omitted: summary of Paragraphs 7 and 8 above; repetition of valid and invalid first and second election rounds, of first and second election rounds which do or did not produce results in both individual and regional voting districts, and preliminary conditions for calculating regional slate vote results]

3. Calculating the results of a valid election round in a regional voting district:

a. The valid votes cast for the parties' electoral slates shall be added up (hereinafter: "total valid votes").

b. One mandate shall be added to the number of mandates that may be acquired in the voting district (hereinafter: "divisor").

c. The number of total valid votes shall be divided by the divisor. The resultant quotient is the number of votes needed to acquire a mandate.

d. Two-thirds of the number of votes needed to acquire a mandate must be determined (hereinafter: "two-thirds limit").

e. The number of votes cast for the party's electoral slate shall be divided by the number of votes needed to acquire a mandate. The whole number resulting from this division is the number of mandates acquired. [passage omitted] The remainder resulting from the division function, as well as the votes not resulting in a mandate, are the fractional votes.

f. In the event that after distributing the mandates pursuant to (e) above a vacant mandate remains, the parties shall receive mandates up to the two-thirds limit according to the declining order of fractional votes. Irrespective of the two-thirds limit, it is impossible to distribute more mandates if all mandates are filled within a voting district. Fractional votes which do not result in a mandate must be placed on the national slate, except for fractional votes defined in Paragraph 8, Subparagraph 4.

g. Mandates not filled in regional voting districts following performance of the calculations specified under (f) shall be placed on the national slate.

#### III. Distribution of Mandates That May Be Obtained on the National Slate Based on Fractional Votes

1. Fractional votes that come about in individual and regional voting districts (Paragraph 9, Subparagraph 1, (a) and (b)) shall be added up nationwide, separately by

parties, with due regard to Paragraph 8, Subparagraph 4 of this law (hereinafter: "fractional votes cast for the party").

2. Fractional votes cast for parties shall be totaled on a nationwide scale (hereinafter: "national fractional vote").

3. The number of mandates on the regional slate not filled (Part II, Section 3, g) shall be added to the number of mandates (Paragraph 58) that may be acquired on the national slate.

4. The number of the national fractional vote shall be divided by the number of mandates that may be filled, pursuant to Section 3 above. This quotient is the number of votes needed to fill a mandate.

5. The number of fractional votes cast for a party shall be divided by the number of votes required to fill a mandate. The whole number resulting from the division is the number of votes acquired by the party. Fractions and fractional votes not resulting in a mandate are repeat fractional votes (hereinafter: "repeat fractional votes").

6. In the event that an unfilled mandate remains following the distribution of mandates pursuant to Section 5 above, the number of repeat fractional votes shall be divided by the number of unfilled mandates. The calculation will result in a new number for votes required to fill a mandate. Based on the new quotient, the filling of mandates must be continued in the declining order of repeat fractional votes, until the number of mandates established pursuant to Section 3 above are filled on the basis of the declining order of repeat fractional votes.

7. The calculation must be repeated if, after completion of the calculations pursuant to Section 6 above, further unfilled mandates remain, after having deducted the mandates filled and the votes that were needed to fill those mandates.

#### **IV. Relationship Between the Four-Percent Limit, and Mandates That May Be Acquired on the Regional Slate**

1. The number of votes cast for regional slates shall be added up on a nationwide scale, separately per party (hereinafter: "the number of slate votes cast for the party").

2. The number of slate votes cast for the party shall be totaled (hereinafter: "the number of slate votes").

3. The figure representing four percent of the slate vote shall be calculated.

4. Any party whose number of slate votes cast for the party exceeds four percent shall obtain its mandates acquired in regional voting districts and from the national slate.

5. Any party whose number of slate votes cast for the party does not exceed the four-percent figure:

a. Shall lose the fractional votes acquired in individual voting districts;

b. Shall not acquire a mandate in regional voting districts; and

c. Shall not receive a mandate through the national slate. [passage omitted]

#### **Explanation for Laymen**

25000690 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
23 Mar 90 p 7

[Article by B. L.: "How Election Results Are Determined—Election Mathematics. For Determined, Interested Persons"]

[Text] The relatively complicated rules of the Hungarian mixed individual and slate voting system do not enable the quick announcement of results. Although the law provides that the OVB [National Election Committee] must publicize preliminary results within 24 hours after tallying the vote, there is hardly any chance of accomplishing that. If in a few election precincts, or perhaps in an entire voting district, the election produces no results, it will be impossible to accurately determine the total number of votes cast for each party, and thus the four-percent threshold value. Consequently, one will not be able to tell how many parties acquire mandates. Accordingly, it is unlikely that on Sunday evening after 2000 hours we can all sit down in front of the television set and expect to learn within a matter of hours the final results of the first democratic, multiparty elections.

Determining the exact results of the elections will be possible only after a number of mathematical calculations are performed. We would like to spare our readers from having to read the details of these calculations, but a certain sketchy mathematical review must be provided in order to understand the way mandates are to be distributed. This is made somewhat easier by the fact that in the interest of determining the election results the professionals at the OVB have already created a "model" for the rules by which mandates are to be distributed.

Determining the absolute majority acquired in individual voting districts does not take magic. But it is more complicated to determine the number of mandates to which parties are entitled based on votes apportioned on regional slates and on the national slate.

First of all, one must figure out how many votes are needed to acquire a mandate. (This is calculated by dividing the number of votes cast for county slates by the number of votes needed to acquire a mandate plus one. The quotient shows how many votes are needed to acquire a representative seat.) If a party receives more votes than are needed to acquire a mandate, the surplus will qualify as fractional vote and will be transferred to the national slate.

Voters need not understand this method of calculation, of course; all they have to do is to indicate in the appropriate spaces on the two ballot forms which candidate and which party they are voting for. Election



committees, on the other hand, will make divisions and multiplications even after the ballot boxes are closed. If after the first division a vacant mandate remains, it will be once again a turn for the party which acquires the largest number of votes. Quite naturally, only as many mandates may be distributed in this way as may be

acquired in a given voting district according to the law. And so that it does not become so "simple," one must also figure out the two-thirds value of the figure needed to acquire a mandate. Below that figure, the parties cannot acquire a mandate even after the "second distribution." [See Table 1]

Table 1.  
Hypothetical Election Results in a Regional Voting District

Name of Party	"A"	"B"	"C"	"D"	"E"	"F"	"G"	"H"	"I"	"J"	Total
Number of Votes	56,000	28,000	42,000	33,600	30,800	25,200	19,600	22,400	5,600	16,800	280,000
Percentage of Vote	20	10	15	12	11	9	7	8	2	6	100

County population: 560,000. Number of eligible voters: 420,000. Number of actual voters: 294,000 (70 percent). Number of invalid votes cast: 14,000 (4.76 percent). Total number of valid votes cast: 280,000 (95.23 percent). Number of mandates from slates: 8. Divisor:  $8 + 1 = 9$ . Number of votes needed to acquire a mandate: 280,000 divided by 9 = 31,111. Two-thirds limit: 20,740.

Let us assume that the OVB has already determined that the four-percent limit is 202,800. Let us further assume that the parties "H," "I," and "J" in the example receive fewer than 202,800 votes on a national scale, and therefore cannot acquire mandates on the regional slate.

Party "A" in Table 1 received 56,000 votes. The number of votes needed to acquire a mandate is 31,111. In performing the division it turns out that Party "A" will receive one mandate, and that its fractional votes number 24,889.

Party "B" in Table 1 has 28,000 votes. But we already know that the number of votes needed to acquire a mandate is 31,111. Accordingly, this party will not receive a mandate, but it will have 28,000 fractional votes.

We may perform the same calculation with regard to parties "C," "D," "E," "F," and "G." On the other hand, we should not perform this calculation with regard to Parties "H," "I," and "J," because they

remained below the national four-percent limit, and therefore will be unable to acquire regional mandates.

In the "first division" it was possible to distribute three out of the eight available mandates based on the number of votes (31,111) needed to acquire a mandate. But we continue with the distribution of mandates. Additional mandates may be received by parties whose number of votes received is higher than the two-thirds limit (20,740).

First we will assign a mandate to party "E" which has the highest number of fractional votes (30,800), followed by party "B" (28,000), party "F" (25,200), and party "A" (24,889). With this we have distributed another four mandates, for a total of seven. The eighth mandate cannot be assigned because the number of fractional votes received by party "G" is 19,600, a figure below the two-thirds limit (20,740).

Party "A" in Table 1 had 24,889 votes left after the first division, and it received that one mandate because this number was higher than the two-thirds limit. In the end, the parties receive their mandates as shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Name of Party	"A"	"B"	"C"	"D"	"E"	"F"	"G"	"H"	"I"	"J"	Total
Number of Mandates	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	—	—	—	7

Accordingly, seven of the eight mandates were distributed. The one unfilled mandate is transferred to the national slate, where  $58 + 1 = 59$  mandates will be distributed, based on the national total of fractional votes.

Mandates From the National Slate

The law provides that parties establishing national slates may receive 58 mandates in addition to the mandates acquired on the basis of regional slates. Voters do not

cast votes separately for the national slate; it is the ratio of fractional votes cast for the parties that determines the number of representative seats each party receives. This is also determined by a rather complicated calculation.

Accordingly, the first thing they do is to add up the fractional votes. Parties which do not exceed the magic four-percent limit will not receive mandates either from the regional or the national slates. If, by coincidence, the numbers of fractional votes acquired by two parties is identical, the party whose sequential number is smaller on the list of parties will receive a mandate before the other.

### Estimate of Regional Slate Results

25000690 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
28 Mar 90 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Slate Game"]

[Text] With the help of mathematician Peter Pal Palfy we figured out the way parties receive representative seats based on county slate voting, and on preliminary percentage results received thus far.

No percentage totals were received from Gyor-Sopron County, thus the table lacks those figures. In calculating the

Budapest results we considered the latest partial results received as of press time. Quite naturally, the table was prepared on the basis of knowledge acquired thus far, therefore changes are possible!

This data pertains to the total of 116 mandates which may be acquired on the basis of regional slates. Pursuant to the election law, a maximum of 152 mandates may be distributed, but, due to actual conditions that have evolved in the course of the elections, it is most likely that 30 mandates will be placed on the national slate, pursuant to the election law.

County	MDF	SZDSZ	FKgP	MSZP	FIDESZ	KDNP
Baranya	1	1	1	—	—	—
Bacs-Kiskun	2	2	2	1	—	—
Bekes	2	1	1	1	1	—
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén	3	2	1	2	1	1
Csongrad	3	1	1	—	—	—
Fejér	2	2	1	1	—	—
Gyor-Sopron	—	—	—	—	—	—
Hajdu-Bihar	2	2	1	1	—	—
Heves	1	1	—	—	—	1
Jász-Nagykún-Szolnok	1	1	1	1	—	—
Komarom-Esztergom	1	1	—	—	—	—
Nograd	1	1	—	—	—	1
Pest	4	3	2	1	1	1
Somogy	1	1	1	1	—	—
Szabolcs-Szatmár	2	1	1	1	1	1
Tolna	1	1	—	—	—	1
Vas	1	1	—	—	—	—
Veszprem	2	1	1	—	1	—
Zala	1	1	1	—	—	1
Budapest	8	8	1	4	3	1
Total	39	32	16	14	7	8

Based on our table we may say that quite a few people have assured their places with great certainty in the new parliament. Thus, Imre Pozsgay who did not rank first in his individual voting district, may regard himself a member of the new parliament, because he heads the MSZP's [Hungarian Socialist Party] slate in Bacs-Kiskun County. Based on the county slate, Ferenc Kosa of the Socialist Party also became a representative. Similarly, based on this data, the following persons may regard themselves as representatives: Lajos Fur of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] as head of the Vas County slate of candidates; Peter Tolgyessy, who leads the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] slate in Komarom-Esztergom County; Jozsef Torgyan, who heads the Smallholders list in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County; and Viktor Orban of FIDESZ [Association of Democratic Youth], who leads that party's Pest County slate of candidates.

### TISZATAJ Editor Justifies His MSZP Membership

25000685E Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
11 Mar 90 p 8

[Interview with Jozsef Annus, TISZATAJ editor in chief, by Istvan Tanacs, place and date not given: "We Need Mohacs—But Every 30-40 Years?"]

[Text] It is fashionable nowadays to present the party-state's repressive actions as decorations acquired as a result of bloodshed, and to refer to these as a matter of self-justification. Jozsef Annus, the leader of TISZATAJ who was kicked out once and then rehabilitated (he was deputy editor in chief in 1986, today he is the editor in chief), would be able to find things of this nature to make reference to. Nevertheless, as Csongrad County's third election district candidate for representative he is wearing the colors of the Hungarian Socialist Party



[MSZP]. He could have followed another flag—the way the newspaper and the editors think is close to the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]. Annus was a founding member of the Peter Veres Society, which subsequently formed the Hungarian People's Party [MNP].

### Humiliation and Bridge Building

[NEPSZABADSAG] Why did you join the MSZP, and why did you agree to be a candidate for representative?

[Annus] I believe that this is a new party. As Imre Pozsgay said: "It is not quite the way we would like it to be, but it may become that way." It is, of course, not easy to bear that everyone is shooting at our ship because of the flag under which we sail. But this is not at all unusual, considering the things that happened to me earlier. Most of this party was in the opposition even within that one party. I personally was humiliated even after I was told to leave TISZATAJ. As a result of negotiations between those in power and Writers Club chairman Tibor Cseres I was removed even from the Writers Club secretarial post responsible for the countryside. Andras Knopp openly stated that I was a marginal party member. I am not unaccustomed to being squeezed in the opposition.

[NEPSZABADSAG] What would be better in your view, if the MSZP could be a member of the government coalition, or if it were in the parliamentary opposition?

[Annus] It would be best for the party to stay in the opposition, but it would be best for the nation for it to be part of the government. In the opposition the MSZP could become a modern European party within two or three years. If, on the other hand, it would come out of the election capable of becoming part of the coalition, it could act as a measured, sober guard, seeing to it that the change in the system is not accompanied by more shocks to the country than are absolutely necessary.

[NEPSZABADSAG] You are a writer of peasant origins; most of your character is defined by that. Even in relation to this basic condition, a party which strongly underscores the national ideal would be a better match.

[Annus] I am able to profess my being Hungarian within the MSZP. Incidentally, I do not claim to be Hungarian with a lapel pin decorated with the dual cross; I do it inside, in my heart. And not just a year ago, but ever since we tried to build a bridge at TISZATAJ to reach not only Hungarians residing beyond our borders, but also the neighboring people.

### To Pick Up the Tracks?

[NEPSZABADSAG] TISZATAJ and its editors always tried to build a bridge to neighboring people. This effort faced many difficulties during the dictatorships, but I wonder, has this become easier since the tyrants fell?

[Annus] An awful lot of experts have arisen in this matter lately, but some of them are causing as much harm today as the old ideological superintendents caused before.

Gyorgy Aczel used to say in those days: Whenever we raise our voice on behalf of Hungarians in Romania, they close a Hungarian school over there. In reply, Andras Suto said: They will close two schools if we say nothing. There have also been good-for-nothing official contacts before; sister city delegations went back and forth in the framework of an annual program, to eat that mandatory lamb stew. Today the situation is different, and the danger is also different. Amateurs try to export amateur ideologies beyond the borders, thereby destroying even that solidarity which evolved among the sons of various nations during the days of the revolution. Laszlo Nemeth once wrote: "The mother country could help Hungarians beyond the borders most by showing good examples." Laszlo Tokes states the same by saying, "the best help is for us to have something we can look up to." I translated this idea for myself as follows: The best foreign policy is a good domestic policy.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Is it possible to look up to today's Hungarian domestic politics?

[Annus] These days an awful lot of irresponsible people and irresponsible organizations let their voices be heard. They would sell the country out for a piece of power, a clever statement, or the roar of applause. I am close to honest, moderate men—I could mention Ferenc Kosa or Sandor Csoori—regardless of their party affiliations. I agree with every word Sandor Csoori said not too long ago in the MDF weekly: "A few years ago we decided that we would enter that certain constitutional state by way of a quiet transition. We should have maintained that pace, because the revolution that has been going on and continues to go on began in Hungary in 1956, and we paid a high price in blood for it. Accordingly we have the right not to pay in blood the second time. And if this is so, one could say in the firmest terms that considerate thought must direct these processes. No one can accuse me of being much in favor of Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] members. They have given me a lot of discomfort during the past 25 or 30 years. Despite this fact I recognize that in this party—which, as we know, has since been disbanded—one finds very many outstanding people. But these people were also to be clearly trampled into the ground. I have had enough of that! I regarded, and I regard human values always as more important than all kinds of party politics. (...) We are simply unable to engage ourselves in politics unless we are able to act as guardians of human values."

[NEPSZABADSAG] Do you feel that the danger conjured up by Csoori is truly threatening?

[Annus] As a child I witnessed in the Maroslele (at that time they called it Puspoklele) estate how people let out "their thousand-year-old anger." In Puspoklele the fate of servants was not as hellish as is described by populist writers in sociographic descriptions about other estates. And yet, within half an hour after the superintendent escaped, the servants besieged the mansion; they tore down and destroyed everything they could lay their hands on. They tore out the wires from the piano, how

good, how strong a string that was. I received a coffee grinder that had to be turned on the top; I took it home with great joy. I will never forget when they picked up the rails of the narrow track train that belonged to the estate, so that the old world could not return on those rails. Those tracks would have been needed once autumn, and the bottomless mud, arrived. Not even the oxen were able to pull out the carriages that were stuck in the mud. I am concerned, because now some irrational anger has accumulated—even if this anger is 40, not a thousand, years old. Invoking Ady, someone said: It is true that we Hungarians need Mohacs [1526 Battle of Mohacs], but do we need Mohacs every 30 or 40 years?

#### Measure and Sober Mind

[NEPSZABADSAG] How do you bear the burden presented by the election campaign?

[Annus] It is difficult. I am unable to become a loud-mouth and hurt others. I don't want to do that. I want to concentrate on the future. I want to understand people who honor me by coming to my rallies; I tell them that we need Europe and Europe does not need us. I stand helpless when some do not even want to understand this. Someone at the meeting stands up and says: The party-state has crippled his child to the point that he sits in an angle on the chair at school. If I would want to be really tough I could say: Did Janos Berecz raise that child, or did his father also have something to do with it? I am not accustomed to making such statements, because every word uttered and written today must strengthen the forces of a measured attitude and a sober mind.

### POLAND

#### Movement for Polish Politics: Center-Right Coalition Proposal

90EP0405A Warsaw LAD in Polish No 7, 18 Feb 90 pp 4-5

[Interview with Tomasz Wolek, official representative, Movement for Polish Politics by Jerzy Wysocki; place and date not given: "Polish Political Scene: Movement for Polish Politics"]

[Text] The RPP [Movement for Polish Politics] was set up on 4 November 1989 at a meeting in which OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club] deputies, activists from citizens committees, economic societies and industrial societies and participants from a range of clubs, associations, and political groups participated.

As stated in the communique, "those gathered created an initiatives team for the Movement for Polish Politics aimed at building the foundations for a future political party with a broad center-right orientation."

The preliminary program document states: "We wish to aim at an attempt toward a natural synthesis which will combine in its program various ideological-political currents that are essentially related. We have in mind a

party which draws upon the achievements of several strains of tradition, but which does not constitute a direct continuation of any historical party. While maintaining respect for the legacy of history, we look to the future."

The document names four ideological currents which are to become the elements of the program platform for this political formation:

- Christian thought perceived in its broad social dimension, i.e., above all as a foundation of a values system which constitutes a moral cement of actions, choices and decisions, including those of a political character;
- liberal thought with its freedom ethos which includes man's inborn freedom of religion, speech, convictions and freedom to associate, as well as a series of economic freedom together with his inviolable right to private property and unfettered economic initiative;
- conservative thought as a certain type of sensibility and a style of political thinking which expresses respect for enduring values rooted in tradition and signifying, among other things, the role of religion and the church in public life and the significance of the institutions of the state and the law;
- national thinking with its category of the national interest, which in domestic policy denotes concern for the common good and in foreign policy denotes the Polish right of state stripped of former ideological criteria.

The representatives of the RPP initiatives team are: Michal Chalonski (OKP deputy), Michal Wojtczak (OKP deputy, deputy minister of agriculture), and Tomasz Wolek (journalist).

[LAD] In what sense is the RPP a continuation of the Young Poland Movement [RMP] which arose in 1979, in its later years also functioned as a community for "Polish Politics" and constituted one of the groups making up the KMP [Young Poland Confederation] "Seniorate"?

[Wolek] Formally speaking, one is hard pressed to speak of a continuation. The RMP existed in a somewhat different reality. It was a formula which was sufficient for the times. By now, however, the RMP is already a historical formation which endures only in certain ideological and friendship ties. It is a fact, however, that the RPP was cocreated by a series of persons who hailed from the RMP. Nor is there any doubt that the intellectual achievements of the RMP will strengthen the program thinking of this new edifice which has now been created. Nonetheless, it has also absorbed people and communities which were not formerly linked with the RMP.

[LAD] In conjunction with this, has the ideological platform been expanded?

[Wolek] I do not wish to set up a hierarchy here to indicate whose achievements are the most important. Certainly, the RMP as one of the oldest oppositionist communities in Poland presents the most striking picture. However, during the phase of the creation of the new movement, inspirations from various directions blended creatively. I think that extremely valuable input was contributed by people who came from the economic societies movement, whose views hark back to Christian liberalism, the line of thinking developed by the late Miroslaw Dzielski. On the other hand, the activists of citizens committees from various parts of the country have contributed valuable experiences which emanate from the new political reality. [LAD] Let us move on to program issues. I find the idea of synthesizing nonleftist ideological currents, which have a European and Polish tradition of primarily being articulated separately, to be interesting intellectually. But what political sense is there in creating such a specific formation? [Wolek] Briefly, let me put it this way. Until the present time, we received an inheritance from our ancestors. Generally this inheritance was worked out in a straight line, by direct linkage to the current of political thought of the Second Republic. Of course, those who traced their descent in this way were entitled to do so. But it is our conviction that over the course of time, these historical ties have become frayed and that now it is difficult to find their threads. We believe that the world has changed so much that it is impossible to recreate divisions which existed a half-century ago.

Apart from this we observe that modern day Poles generally do not represent some sort of cohesive and precise ideological option. Socialism and any sort of leftist thinking is foreign to them. This does not mean that they have an intellectual or psychic need to be chiseled out of a single mass. That is why there is a need to create a program synthesis of the contemporary motifs which appear in related currents. I think that for many people, such a proposition may prove to be very attractive.

[LAD] And if we recognized that there are also some reasonable elements in socialism, in adding socialism to the catalogue of currents needing to be synthesized we would have the plenitude of Adam Michnik's ideas.

[Wolek] Adam Michnik's thinking, which harks back to Leszek Kolakowski's famous formula of "how to be a conservative-liberal socialist," has nothing in common with those things of which I have been speaking. I do not have in mind such a catchall, but a synthesis only of related currents. In general, I do not seek to obliterate political differences (which is what Adam Michnik tries to do) but to try to structure the political landscape so that these differences do not become focused on dozens of minute points but on the major ideological-political orientations of the day and on the most fundamental convictions and values. On the other hand, to add socialism to the catalogue of the currents which are related to us is an attempt to demonstrate that there is no

difference between the right and the left, that these categories in general do not depict our reality. Meanwhile...

[LAD] I propose that we not speak of these differences. They are obvious and are manifested time and again. My statement was only intended to stimulate discussion. Nonetheless, I wonder whether such a broad construction as the center-right will lend itself to working out a joint ideological and program platform.

[Wolek] I think that it will be a lengthy process of reconciling views and reaching an understanding between the currently dispersed communities of the center-right. It is very possible that for many issues this will prove to be very difficult, and perhaps impossible. It may be a long time before one cohesive center-right camp emerges in Poland. At the same time, however, I am convinced that at such very crucial moments as an election or a referendum, it will be possible to develop a joint platform.

[LAD] But that is something else entirely. That is a concept for a "Consultative Committee of Center-Right Groups for Election Affairs". Meanwhile, as I understand it, the RPP wants to build a more cohesive structure.

[Wolek] Such a thing cannot be so precisely planned since, as I said, it will surely involve a lengthy conciliation process. We wish to act to inspire this process and as a catalyst for it. It will be an attempt at laying footbridges, at building spans... For example, envisaging for liberals that their option is not so very different from the option professed by communities which present themselves as conservative.

Of course, we shall seek allies for this concept among moderate groups. If, e.g., the national option for someone is reduced to chauvinism, then such a person will recognize our concept to be a feeble one, an attempt to mix water and fire. We are aware of this, but we will not even attempt to combine water with such a fire. Otherwise a situation will arise in which achieving a joint position is simply impossible.

[LAD] Over the long term, do you see the creation of two strong and somewhat organized blocs: the center-right and the left?

[Wolek] I think that this would be the optimal arrangement. A sound right and left are the guarantee of painless change in politics, of the shift of certain accents and, hence, of social stability. This is the underlying structure of West European democracy.

[LAD] But I am afraid that the creation of even a cohesive center-right bloc will not lead to the emergence of a noncommunist leftist camp. There will be the center-right and there will be Solidarity.

[Wolek] That would be an absurd, unrealistic arrangement. The incipient center-right movement is not some sort of alternative to Solidarity. I believe it is 90 percent

people who, to the same degree as people of the left, created Solidarity and defended it.

On the other hand, I do not think that over the long term it is possible to maintain such a mystified picture of some great Solidarity magma on the one hand and, unrivaled, some sort of center-right standing apart on the sideline. More and more, Solidarity will have to separate into a trade union and a political force that cannot be built along the lines of a National Unity Front. In conjunction with this, some sort of articulation of leftist thinking will have to be the answer to a Polish center-right.

[LAD] But the temptation to make use of Solidarity as a symbol will continue to exist for a long time. This already places the center-right in a worse position at the outset. Thus, at this stage, is it not better to strive for influence over the face of Solidarity than to act independently?

[Wolek] None of these extreme solutions are good and effective. On the one hand, political honesty demands that one speak in one's own voice without hiding behind a Solidarity screen. On the other hand, we do not wish to come out as a "counter" to Solidarity, nor do we see any reason to do so. In the self-government election, our people, who are also active on citizens committees, should not allow themselves to be pushed out, thus conceding the election to other political forces. This is a tactic for the present. On the other hand, I must state in general that the future belongs to movements which take the responsibility to act. It is impossible for Solidarity to be such an enormous shroud over Polish political life until the end of our history and for everything peeking out of this shroud to be relegated to the domain of cranks turning things upside down.

[LAD] Not everyone can be a European. Thank you for the interview.

#### **Agrarian Party Leaders on Program Differences, Coalition Possibilities**

90EP0402A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish  
23 Jan 90 p 3

[Roundtable discussion held at ZYCIE WARSZAWY editorial office with Dr. Gabriel Janowski, chairman, Rural Solidarity NSZZ RI (Private Farmers); Gen. Franciszek Kaminski, president, Polish Peasant Party (PSL); and Dr. Jozef Zych, chairman, Supreme Council, Polish Peasant Party "Rebirth" conducted by Zdzislaw Zaryczny and first published in the ZYCIE WARSZAWY Peasant Forum: "Fields To Sow"]

[Excerpts] Several weeks after the peasant congresses, we invited the leaders of the major groups in the peasant movement to our editorial office. This was the first meeting of this type, coming at a time when political and

economic changes in rural Poland are clearly accelerating. We devoted a discussion of several hours to these very changes and to the opportunities and dangers they bring. [passage omitted]

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] I extend a sincere welcome to you and I thank you for accepting ZYCIE WARSZAWY's invitation. Let us begin with the question: In what ways do your organizations really differ from one another today?

[F. Kaminski] While I do not see any real differences, we must realize that our programs have not yet been defined sufficiently. The PSL adopted a program left by Mikolajczyk in 1947—I am referring to him and to the PSL "Rebirth". My assessment of the pragmatic program of Rural Solidarity is also a positive one. [J. Zych] A return to tradition—yes. The adaptation of Mikolajczyk's program—yes. But not only history. We must pay more attention to realities and read earlier signs in terms of the present situation of Poland and, of course, of rural areas. The PSL "Rebirth" Congress has also spoken out on two important issues: first—the future united peasant party should be a nationwide party, second—in its work it should be founded upon the social teaching of the church.

[G. Janowski] There are no fundamental differences between us, nor would it be right for any such differences to exist, especially since the PSL "Rebirth" is now declaring a return to sources, to the common roots that the ideas of the PSL provided for all of us. This does not mean that we shall erase from memory the disgraceful past of the ZSL [United Peasant Party], which led to stagnation in agriculture during the 40 years of the PRL. These "sins" will continue to be a burden for a long time. That is why the PSL "Rebirth" must show itself to be completely trustworthy—through a new program and new people.

[J. Zych] That sounds nice, but in practice it is extremely difficult to effect such a "purge" and to discriminate among and evaluate people in such a way. Nor would I fool myself in this matter. The PSL "Rebirth" made a serious assessment of the past at the founding congress, and the reform current clearly won out. Obviously, there must be a complete cleanup, but this must be done in the course of building the program, making congress and unification preparations and preparing for elections and the like. Those who do not fit into the new structure and are not accepted will depart.

[G. Janowski] I do not doubt that this will lead to the reconciliation and joining together of the various elements of the peasant movement...

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] On what plane?

[G. Janowski] On a plane that is obvious to me—that of the economic program. I am convinced that modern parties will not be the traditional sort of parties banded together by ideology, religion or the like. They will be more like movements or, to use the old terminology,



levies in mass for solving concrete problems. In particular our attitude toward the economy, our thinking and our economic program, including our agricultural program will have decisive importance. These are issues which will unite or divide us.

[F. Kaminski] That is why we ought to aim to create a strong, nationwide peasant party, which is needed by Poland today. A party which would be a leading force...

[G. Janowski] ...but not a leadership force?

[F. Kaminski] No, no, we have already had sufficient training in that. What I have in mind is merely that peasants can play an important role in our state. They are a stable class which represents precious moral values and a national and state instinct. They have demonstrated their patriotism many times. "They feed and defend", why should they not govern?...

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] All indications are that in the near future, the peasant movement will be subject to a severe test. First Lech Walesa, and then Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki called for the self-government elections to be stepped up. And so in April [now scheduled for 27 May] we shall see who represents which force and which of the peasant leaders has an ace up his sleeve. Do you gentlemen anticipate a joint peasant bloc and joint candidates?

[J. Zych] I divulge nothing by saying here that on 22 December we spoke with Lech Walesa on that subject at a coalition meeting. Soon we shall become a coalition with Solidarity and the SD [Democratic Party]. Does that mean that we should coordinate our plans? At length we concluded that we shall work together, but on a general plane, in the sense that we shall promote the best programs and the best candidates, those that will be able to govern the Polish gmina, our mini-fatherlands...

[G. Janowski] As a union, we have two most important fields to sow—after we first till them—i.e., economic recovery and self-governmental elections. One step in this area is our appointment of a special commission for the affairs of the territorial self-government. The task of this commission will be to prepare materials and to train people. Despite appearances, the effective execution of the offices of wojt, mayor and councilman requires great skill. We have been methodically deprived of this skill for 40 years.

[F. Kaminski] At the "bottom" there is total agreement regarding the need for joint action during these elections. I believe that there is an opportunity for creating an electoral bloc of populists, especially since the competition will be quite formidable.

[G. Janowski] But why must the "top" set this up when the people at the "bottom" have common sense and if, for example, there are some sort of election meetings organized in rural areas, nothing stands in the way of the

PSL member's and the Solidarity member's meeting together—why should we rent halls separately and overpay?

[J. Zych] But it seems to me that people will always say to you: What do you suggest, with which PSL members should we cooperate?

[G. Janowski] The PSL is not divided into "these" and "those"! There is one rural concern. I feel sorry for those activists (of course, I am not addressing this to you, general) who created various organizations under the PSL banner, confused people and made our peasant movement look ridiculous.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] The peasants are a great force. But if they fight with each other, it becomes very difficult to get them together for reconciliation...

[G. Janowski] It is not the peasants who are fighting—someone wants to set them at odds with each other! Apparently the force of which you spoke does not suit someone. Besides, that has always been the case: if not the priest, then the landlord, if not the landlord, then the PPS [Polish Socialist Party], if not the PPS, then the communists—everyone envisaged "his own" peasant party. Today the government would also like to have "its own" peasant party...

[F. Kaminski] Fortunately, the peasants do not look back at this. There are more and more examples: Zamosc, Krakow, Lublin and the like.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] This is all happening too slowly. You have been speaking of unification for nearly a year now.

[F. Kaminski] Thus far it has not been possible to take rapid action. One organization arose late, another took too long being restructured and the like. As a result, now we must embark upon several tasks at once.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Is the peasant movement able to assume responsibility not only for rural and agricultural issues, but also for the socioeconomic development of Poland?

[G. Janowski] If we use as our point of departure the question: What must we resolve in Poland today?—we must also ask: Who is to do the resolving? We more or less know "what" must be resolved, since we continue to face the burning question of agriculture and the food economy. And now please show me who will solve this basic Polish problem, for today and for tomorrow? In my estimation, it is only the people who know about this and are themselves interested in it, i.e., the farmers, the most numerous social stratum and the most occupationally cohesive stratum.

[J. Zych] I am afraid that the peasant movement is still not ready for this. All of the program omissions, internal divisions and personal animosities are bearing evil consequences. I think that it will only become possible to work on this when the peasant movement is united.

[G. Janowski] Gentlemen, before the movement is united—life still goes on and it requires of us immediate answers, not in words but in deeds. That is why I, as the chairman of rural Solidarity, turn to you regarding cooperation to create an economic program. And not only do I turn to you, but to all who perceive the issues which surround us in the same way.

[J. Zych] During the agriculture debate, the deputies of PSL "Rebirth" emphasized precisely what you have just said. I, too, reiterated it following the address of Premier Mazowiecki. Meanwhile, speaking of a program and presenting one's own concepts is continually viewed as an attack on the government, the "removal of bricks from the wall"...

[G. Janowski] We are all children of the Stalinist system. This includes the members of the present government. It is embedded in our subconscious that if someone thinks differently, that means that he is tormenting us. Meanwhile, politicians must get used to the idea that they will be tormented.

[F. Kaminski] But someone must assume the responsibility for the future fate of the fatherland and prepare programs for reconstructing the whole of state life. It is my belief that only the peasant stratum is capable of this today.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Is that so? None of your groups has an alternative program which would be attractive and acceptable to society...

[F. Kaminski] There has been no time to work out the details. When we met 2 months ago it was for the first time in 43 years.

[G. Janowski] Rural Solidarity began to create such a program a year ago after emerging from the underground. We prepared documents for the roundtable and for our March congress. If everything had gone as planned, sometime in September of last year we would have had our own economic concept, capable of meshing with Balcerowicz's plan. That is not what happened. The union ran aground and the program could not be completed. It is only now, after the December congress, that we have started moving with our strength redoubled.

[F. Kaminski] Our PSL program, which stipulates the indispensable actions, can constitute the foundation.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] But a half-century has passed...

[F. Kaminski] That does not matter, since the problem of feeding the people still remains. Back in 1946, the PSL program already envisaged the limitation of outlays for heavy industry and the transfer of these outlays into the food complex, which is Poland's great European opportunity. Unfortunately, this opportunity has still not been capitalized upon.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] It is hard to imagine Poland standing in one place while it waits for your program. And if you do not have your own program, you cannot count on political success. You will miss the "train of history".

[G. Janowski] There are problems which must be solved immediately, without major work on a program, e.g., inflation, which Balcerowicz's team has addressed courageously. Here we are in absolute agreement, for inflation is also a big problem for farmers. Another problem is production development. In this area we are already in conflict with the government, which has adopted a different philosophy of arriving at an abundance of goods. We believe that producers should obtain their priorities, credit, legal guarantees for development and the like right at the start.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] You say this, but in the grocery stores either the shelves are bare or food is nightmarishly expensive. It is no wonder that the city is very ill-disposed towards the rural area.

[F. Kaminski] But how is the farmer to blame in this? For example, why does the government import wheat, paying \$200 per ton, when it could purchase it from our peasants at \$100 per ton? Why is this done? Is it really so hard to create terms enabling farmers to fill the country with food and to have enough left for profitable export?

[J. Zych] There is a lack of basic information. Television reports give the price of ham as 70,000 zlotys, but they do not add that the farmer is paid 7,000 zlotys for a kilogram of pork. Who makes money on this? Who is causing prices to skyrocket and is "suffocating" the city? The farmer?...

[G. Janowski] We will not be self-sufficient and competitive with regard to all products and on all markets. We must fix upon three products, for example, one industrial and two agricultural, which will become Poland's specialty worldwide. At one time, revenues from the export of onions equaled revenues for coal export, but no one wished to see this because we wanted so much to be an industrial power...

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] I am wondering whether some great, one-time opportunity is not drying up for the peasant movement...

[J. Zych] I would not put it that way. Today there are simply certain circumstances which are turning the attention of rural areas towards the peasant movement. For example, the activism of PSL "Rebirth" deputies during the agriculture debate, as well as the decisive tone of pronouncements of the rural Solidarity leadership are received very positively by rural areas. This cannot be understood as taking advantage of the state of affairs: it is simply that the situation is difficult and so, for example, the PSL "Rebirth", aspiring to be in authority, like every political party, wants to take advantage of it and is pushing forward without calculating the consequences. This would be a serious mistake, especially since to be entering into a structure of a ruling coalition and we are, in one way or another, co-responsible for its actions.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] Then what can we expect now? How will the events in rural areas and in agriculture develop?

[G. Janowski] I shall repeat here what I told Premier Mazowiecki: beginning with the New Year, if we do not reach the farmers within 6 weeks, they will avoid us like a dung heap and they will move on by themselves. Every government must be based on some social group. The communists based theirs on workers and gave them cheap food and housing and opportunities for professional advancement. Mazowiecki's government has the support of all, which really means it has the support of none. That is why I believe that now the third estate—petty landowners, entrepreneurs, merchants and the like who are the foundation of the market economy—must assume the political initiative. And in today's Poland the third estate is farmers above all.

[J. Zych] If all of us together quickly presented a solid economic program, especially in the area of food production, which really suited the people, then I see a permanent opportunity for an issues coalition uniting the PSL with rural Solidarity before the self-governmental elections and, in the future, before the parliamentary elections. But obviously I do not deny that I would call for the present governmental program to be realized, assuming, of course, the introduction of certain correctives into it. To put it simply, the success of this program means that Poland will avoid a subsequent unnecessary political crisis, the consequences of which none of us is in a position to foresee.

[F. Kaminski] I believe in the peasants, in their power, talents and common sense. I believe in the Polish people, in their gifts and their creative enthusiasm. And where should we begin today? Obviously, with the self-government, with the ordering of life at the "bottom" and the ordering of agricultural policy so that it fosters production. After this matters will take their own course.

[ZYCIE WARSZAWY] We shall see... I do not think that we will have any summing up, for we have posed questions more than we have found answers. Many issues have been left open, awaiting solutions in other fields of social life. Rural Poland is neither an island of happiness nor one of disaster. It is a part of our country and it experiences everything that is our common lot. Gentlemen, thank you for this meeting.

## YUGOSLAVIA

### Kosovo Priest Views Albanian Catholics

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9 Dec 89 pp 6-7

[Interview with Dom Lush Gjergji, parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Uroševac, by Blerim Shala; place and date not given: "Catholic Albanians and Historical Truths"]

[Text] Dom Lush Gjergji, 40-year-old parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Uroševac, completed his studies in philosophy and theology in Rome, studied and took his doctorate at the state university in the "eternal city" in the field of social psychology (his dissertation

was entitled "The Role of the Albanian Woman in the Family and Society"), he is the author of three books about Mother Theresa (Gjergji is her official biographer) which have been translated into Italian, Spanish, English, French, and Hungarian. In an interview with POLET, he spoke about the great influence of the Catholic Church on the formation of cultural and spiritual identity of Albanians, about the murder case of the priest Shtjefan Gjeqovi in 1929, about one of the initiators of ecumenism, about Patriarch Atenagora of Istanbul (also an Albanian), about Mother Theresa, who in 1979 received the Nobel Peace Prize, about the accusations of the Catholic Church and Cardinal Stepinac of genocide, about the statement of Patriarch German in Jasenovac, about Cardinal Kuharic's expression of sympathy for all the victims of violence in Kosovo, about the inevitability of recognizing that every man is fighting for freedom, about the political situation in Kosovo, and about the necessity for the existence of a pluralism of world outlooks.

POLET: It is well-known that Catholic priests (Buzuku, Bogdani, Budi, Gjeqovi, and so on) have had a great influence on formation of the cultural and spiritual identity of Albanians since the 16th century, even though Catholicism is not the only faith among the Albanians. In this century, nevertheless, that influence has been very minor, especially in Kosovo. What can you tell us about that phenomenon?

Gjergji: You know about everything that happened in the time of the so-called Old Yugoslavia. Bishop L Lazar Mjeda was simply "driven out" so that he would not be a bother. He was followed by a Slovenian priest, who even learned Albanian, yet he was unable to establish contact with people as an Albanian priest would have been able to. The government at that time was insisting on Slavization of Albanians, and for that reason we had neither schools nor anything else that would have helped to preserve the ethnic and cultural identity of Albanians here, on which the Catholic Church had a very great influence. The present situation is essentially different; we have quite a few Albanian priests, students of philosophy and theology, we have a journal (monthly) and a publishing house ("Drita"), which has so far published 46 titles...and why not say that within our abilities we are striving to continue that bright tradition in the formation and preservation of the cultural and spiritual identity of the Albanians in these parts!

POLET: Now that we have mentioned that cultural and spiritual identity, in what way has the Catholic Church had the greatest influence among the Albanians?

Gjergji: Well...you see, the Catholic Church has always attempted to strengthen its influence on a people through the so-called process of inculturation. What does that mean? It is simply a question of a specific "encounter" of Catholicism with the tradition and the culture of a people. During this "encounter" religion enriches and spiritualizes the culture and tradition of that people and vice versa, the legacy of that people elevates and enriches

the word of religion. That process is especially evident with the Albanians. That is why it is no exaggeration at all if we say that the church has directly influenced the preservation and spread of Albanian culture and literacy. All the well-known Albanian priests have had a dual conception of their vocation: on the one hand they engaged in religious instruction and preaching, while on the other they worked with all their might to preserve the name and tradition of the Albanians! Pjeter Bogdani, the well-known bishop who was also one of the leaders of the uprising against the Turks in these parts, clearly said on one occasion—after he was offered an opportunity to stay in Padua—that the destiny of his people was also his destiny.

Accordingly, he could not live in Padua nor anywhere else—except with his own people. In order to find out how that people was living, Bogdani had a custom of dressing up in beggar's rags and going in this manner from house to house persuading people, among other things, to continue the resistance against the Turks! As is well-known, Bogdani died of the plague 300 years ago in Pristina.

POLET: Which means that this is an important anniversary. How will the church celebrate that anniversary, especially when we bear in mind that official institutions in Kosovo have somehow maintained silence about this important cultural and spiritual event?

Gjergji: Throughout this entire year we have been publishing articles about him in our journal DRITA. Archbishop Nike Prelaj of the Skopje-Prizren Episcopate ordered that the life and work of Bogdani be spoken about at least once in every parish, and a monument will be erected in Pristina, the city where he died. As far as the other part of your question is concerned, I do not believe that there is anyone who can speak against the life and work of Pjeter Bogdani. I think that not much has been done to celebrate that anniversary, but I am prepared to accept the reasons given for that—for example, the difficult situation here in Kosovo. And by the "situation" I am also referring to the economic difficulties, but also these great human disturbances which have prevented us from all gathering together around a figure and a cultural monument like Bogdani!

POLET: This year also marks the 60th anniversary of the violent death (murder) of the well-known priest Shtjefan Gjeqovi, the founder of ethnology and archeology among the Albanians, the man who collected and classified the well-known legal code *Leke Dukagjini*. Has the case of Gjeqovi's murder ever been cleared up?

Gjergji: The church marked in a dignified way the anniversary of the murder of its son who lived and died for his people. We published in our journal all the documents concerning this case; they make it evident that the priests of our church reported this murder (at Zym near Prizren) to all the government institutions of Yugoslavia at that time. In any case, the official position of the church was "*Oxibus pro fide et patria*" (Murdered

for the faith and for the homeland). I think there is nothing either to add to this or to take away from! Gjeqovi gave his life as a pledge to his God and People.

POLET: One of the best-known figures in this Catholic national tradition among the Albanians is certainly Mother Theresa (or Gonxhe Bojaxhiu), who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979. It is well-known that you are her official biographer; so far you have published three books about this extremely interesting figure of our time.

Gjergji: Yes.... Nevertheless, before I say anything about Mother Theresa, I would also mention the figure of Patriarch Atenagora (also an Albanian), who was patriarch of the Orthodox Church in Istanbul, a position that has the value and range of a pope with the Orthodox, one of the first to be an advocate of ecumenism, that is, the well-known process of relaxation of tension and of understanding between churches. Patriarch Atenagora's resoluteness in overcoming differences should be understood, mostly because an Albanian he could himself understand the disastrousness of the exclusiveness of a religion—since there are Albanians not only of Muslim faith, but also of Catholic and Orthodox faith. Atenagora (who died in 1972) saw early the inevitability of people's unification around humanism, and that is why he insisted on ecumenism and on the well-known decisions of the Second Vatican Council. After Atenagora's meeting (in December 1965) with Pope Paul VI, a joint statement was published on cessation of the validity of the excommunication between these two churches (which had been in effect since 1054, following separation of the Orthodox from the Catholic Church), which, of course, had a great impact in the world.

As for Mother Theresa, it is clear that it would take much more space to say what I know about her and what she deserves because of her good works. I met her for the first time in 1968, and since that time I have followed her constantly and have been her biographer, and I was also with her during those unforgettable 10 days when she received the Nobel Peace Prize 10 years ago (in 1979) in Oslo. To understand a figure like Mother Theresa, one must have an understanding of two worlds, the two regions in which she has lived: the region of Albanians and the region of her second homeland—India. So far, 53 books have been published about her in all the principal languages of the world, which is sufficient evidence of the kind of cultural and historical figure she is. It is well-known that back in the fifties Mother Theresa decided to leave the convent in Calcutta and become directly involved in the fight for every life of that second city within Calcutta, the city of lepers and oppressed, the city of death from hunger and disease. Mother Theresa was a high school principal and teacher in a part of the city which really resembles paradise, and then she set off on her own to the hell of Calcutta in order to do what she had to do: Those who have been to Calcutta (I recently had the good fortune to visit Mother Theresa, following a very difficult operation) say that after 10 days spent there it takes 20 days to rest and recover from the scenes one has witnessed in that city.



POLET: How do you explain the phenomenon of Mother Theresa?

Gjergji: Mother Theresa is no accident at all. She is a sublimation in the best sense of that word of the age-old tradition of hospitality of the Albanians. In this specific case, it is a question of the well-known Bojaxhiu family (in Skopje, where Mother Theresa was born), which in prewar Skopje was well-known as the refuge for all the prisoners and unfortunates of that city, a family that did everything to defend the lives and hopes of those people. Mother Theresa's father, Kole Bojaxhiu, would always say when he had done something good that a good deed should be looked at like a small stone thrown into the sea—that is, that a good deed should not be taken as a great thing—but on the contrary should always be repeated. Mother Theresa is herself repeating in a way her father when she says that the attempt to help prisoners is like a drop in the ocean of poverty, and yet without that drop the ocean would be essentially different. And that is why Mother Theresa says that the most serious disease is not leprosy, cholera, or AIDS, but loneliness and the impossibility of bringing people together, of understanding that they cannot do without each other, that they have to help one another!

Mother Theresa is a pure symbol of that well-known Albanian saying about hospitality "Buke Krye o Zemer" ("Bread, salt, and cordiality"), and everything that she has done in Calcutta and elsewhere she has done by continuing that tradition formed over the centuries.

The monograph on Mother Theresa, which is entitled "Nasa Majka Teresa" [Our Mother Theresa] has been published not only in Albanian, but also in Croatian (it was published by Krscanske Sadasnjost, and another publication of this book in Slovenian is also being prepared) in a printing of 20,000 copies, and in Italian, French, Spanish, English, and Hungarian—which is indication enough of the popularity of a figure like Mother Theresa! This year, my third book about Mother Theresa will be published in Bergamo, and this will round out what we know to this point about Gonxhe Bojaxhiu—the first Albanian to receive the Nobel Prize!

POLET: We know that Mother Theresa was operated on and that she was in a very serious condition. Since you have visited her, tell us how the prisoners of Calcutta have experienced the illness of their Mother.

Gjergji: The fact of the creation of two separate institutions to care for AIDS victims also indicates that Mother Theresa is a phenomenon. She has said on many occasions that she discovers Jesus Christ in every man who is suffering, and accordingly there cannot be any differences between people whatsoever. She is the only one brave enough to create schools in India where Muslims, Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists study side by side with one another (in India, this is unthinkable). Some 200 Hindu girls have agreed to serve Mother Theresa, which is also an extreme rarity. Regardless of everything that I know about this really great figure, all of this is why

in the end I say that Mother Theresa remains a great secret of humanity and of the humanism of our time! As for a specific answer to your question, I can tell you that every evening several hundred thousand people gathered in front of the hospital where Mother Theresa was lying until she herself was able to tell them that she was better, which she did through a loudspeaker. Only then did that great crowd of people disperse!

POLET: After all you have told us about Mother Theresa, we must move on to somewhat "hotter issues" pertaining to the everyday politics of this region of ours. We have been witnesses of a very serious accusation which certain circles (even the official circles of the republic government in Belgrade) have pronounced against the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. It is even being accused of genocide against the Serbs, whereby Stepinac, the church, and Jasenovac are linked together. What can you tell us about these accusations?

Gjergji: There is one thing I can tell you. In the Catholic Church, the pope is the supreme authority, and after him come the cardinals. For me, it is absurd that a man could occupy such an influential position as Archbishop of Zagreb if he hated a nationality and if it was his desire to eradicate that nationality. The church has never evaded historical truth, and accordingly there is no reason for it to fear the truth in this case either. I am surprised at the passions and potential enmity when we return to the past with almost no pretext whatsoever instead of trying to find a better future here. I am also amazed by the well-known sentence pronounced by Mr German, patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who during the consecration of the church in Jasenovac said "We forgive, but we do not forget!"

Forgiveness is the heart of Christianity, so that it may never be linked to particular cases. We must build bridges between people and not insist on passion, grudges, and revenge! The Stepinac case is very clear, it has its roots in a specific cultural and historical region, and accordingly we cannot manipulate it today any way we would like.

POLET: As an Albanian priest, how did you take the expressions of sympathy with all the victims of violence in Kosovo expressed by Cardinal Kuharic?

Gjergji: This gesture of Archbishop Kuharic can be taken as yet another proof of the desire of our Catholic Church to minimize the violence everywhere—including Kosovo. We should all apply everything that we know and all our desires to bring people as close together as possible, to arrive at mutual familiarity and respect—regardless of what nationality or faith you belong to. In the final analysis, this is also the essence of ecumenism, and accordingly we must all work at this. The gesture of Archbishop Kuharic is an imperative of the time, an imperative of the Gospel, and accordingly I can only welcome an expression of sympathy with all the victims of violence in Kosovo.

POLET: Now that we have mentioned Cardinal Kuharic, we can quote a passage from his interview published in *START* on 18 February of this year, in which he says: "And if a man has been unjustly persecuted, if he has been deprived of all his fundamental human rights, then the church stands by him and considers unjust every act that frustrates a man's existence, violates his rights, and insults his dignity." What would be your comment on that quotation?

Gjergji: God gave man freedom, and man cannot live without freedom. Freedom is a precondition of man's existence as such. The church's mission is by no means restricted only to Christians, but goes beyond those limits and concerns all of humanity, i.e., every man individually. We are fighting for human freedom, for knowledge of the truth about man. We cannot and will not draw exclusive differences between those who believe and those who do not believe, between those who are members of the Socialist Alliance and those who are not, between those who go to church and those who go to a mosque. If I honor the postulate that every man is my brother, then that applies both at home and on the street and in the political forum and everywhere else. Accordingly, I perceive the quotation which you have given as a confirmation of the very essence of the mission of the church and of Christianity. And the mission is, of course, humanity as a whole! We are against force, against injustice, against exploitation, against inhumanity, against the trampling on man, and we always remain faithful to these specific features of ours. The most concrete form of solidarization of the Catholic Church with those who follow and who lack basic human rights is the well-known "Theology of Liberation" in Latin America, which defends man and the people against misconceptions and slavery!

POLET: Nevertheless, we have dilemmas and disagreements over the "Theology of Liberation," such as the one between Pope John Paul II and Leonard Bofo.

Gjergji: That is not an essential disagreement at all. It is simply a question of the use of Marxist vocabulary by certain priests, but otherwise there is a unanimous belief that help should be given to all people who are in a difficult situation. Everyone agrees on that. We are fighting for the whole man, and we are not, as it is said, concerned only with the human soul. It seems to us a great untruth when it is said that we are concerned only with the human soul. Man is indivisible in that sense, and accordingly he is also indivisible for us. We are not gravediggers concerned only with burying man. We follow man from his birth, through his culture, tradition, and politics...since man takes part in everything.

POLET: You live in Urosevac, in Kosovo. You are surrounded by everything that characterizes the situation in that region; what can you say to us about that?

Gjergji: Our position on all that is very straightforward and very clear. We favor unconditional freedom of every man,

every family, every people, every nationality. We want all possible problems resolved in a peaceful way, through discussion, without any use of force. We believe that goodness and intelligence can always bring people closer together—in spite of everything. We have to learn to respect one another. I am very happy that I live in an environment such as I do, one that is full of mixed and diverse peoples and nationalities, since in this way my conscience is put to a test every day, a test of the sense of whether I am able to help and to understand every man regardless of his religion or nationality! Since 1975, when I came to Urosevac, many people have come into this room—from atheists to Muslims, Orthodox, and Catholics. I have tried to help them all, and I never made differences because of speech, clothing, nationality, or religion. I will repeat once again that we are against all force and injustice, against all exploitation. For us, differences are assets. Colors are beautiful, since there are many of them. Voices are beautiful when there are many of them. Without a great number of colors, there are no pictures, there is no art. Without a great number of voices, there is no song, there is no choir. The only argument here—as indeed everywhere—should be reason, should be goodness. I will repeat the statement, the wonderful statement, made by Pope John XXIII: "We must seek what binds us together, and we must flee what divides us"! This statement certainly has exceptional value and relevance for all of us who live here in Kosovo today.

POLET: We live in times of great change. It is obvious that the church has also experienced many things, including here in Yugoslavia. From the time of almost complete negation of religion and the church, we have arrived at the most recent proposals in certain competent political institutions that religious holidays be made state holidays. What do you have to say about all of those events?

Gjergji: There certainly have been great changes. I think that the greatest change is that very relation between Christians and Marxists, which is now much more cool-headed, much more moderate. If we desire good for man and for the society which man has created, then we can all certainly find a common language concerning all the problems, concerning all the things which are not clear, concerning all the dilemmas and differences. A society of exclusiveness and absolute monopoly cannot generate anything good. Neither can religious exclusiveness nor the exclusiveness of atheism be acceptable today. Today, it is presumably clear to everyone that we live in a world of pluralism. Regardless, you see, of all possible differences, Europe is uniting. Whether we want to or not, we have to admit that we cannot live without understanding, without charity, without reason, without tolerance. We all must simply understand that there is no such thing as the exclusively Christian world, the Muslim world, the Orthodox world, the world of atheists and socialists. There is the world of man and humanity, the world of humanity and inhumanity, which is precisely the principal message of the Second Vatican Council and of ecumenism in general. And certainly, if we understand that, we will live differently, better, more calmly, intelligently, and humanely.

## POLAND

### Methodology Questioned in State Enterprise Privatization

#### KERM: Draft Law Compromise

90EP0415A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish  
3-4 Feb 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by Zofia Krajewska]

[Text] Finally there is good news for future capitalists. First, as announced by the government spokesman for ownership conversion affairs [privatization], Krzysztof Lis, in eight important state enterprises the preliminary work to privatize them is drawing to an end.

A detailed appraisal of assets is being made and the rules for issuing stock and its public sale are being defined. The present status of the work guarantees that shortly after the Sejm passes a set of laws on privatization, these factories will go on the auction block. As of now, the "addresses" have not been revealed, nevertheless we know that these are enterprises which are prospering and that the purchase of their stock will ensure the future shareholders considerable benefits. According to the spokesman, "promotional" privatization may take place as soon as within the next 3 months.

Second, and what is most important, KERM (Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers) at Friday [2 Feb 90] evening's meeting, examined the outline of the set of documents relating to privatization of the economy. These documents included a program for privatization of state enterprises, a preliminary examination and a proposal for measures to be taken to hasten the so-called "little" privatization, and a draft law on the creation of a National Assets Board and an Agency for Privatization. But the most important item on the agenda was the draft law on privatization of state enterprises, whose stormy birth took over 3 months. The draft is a government compromise primarily between the initial concept of privatization as set forth by the government spokesman, Krzysztof Lis, and the proposals made by Tadeusz Syryjczyk, minister of industry. Nevertheless, it did not protect the document from further revisions made during the course of KERM deliberations.

The following principles form the "ideological" foundation of the draft law on privatization. Equal access to stock by all citizens with certain preferences for "small" savers, persons with relatively modest savings. Full transferability of stock purchased, which, speaking in understandable language, means unlimited freedom to buy and sell this stock. An honest assessment of the health of the enterprises being privatized and observance of the rule that if it is to bankrupt, better that it should do so as a state enterprise than as a private enterprise. The appraisal of the enterprise's assets should arouse no public objection. Protection of citizens against placing money in their own factory, now on the verge of bankruptcy, which may mean not only loss of a job, but loss

of an entire life's savings. Closely defined preferences for employee stockholding—setting a limit of 20 percent on the share of employee stock which can be bought at reduced prices out of the total amount of stock issued. Finally, acceptance of the rule that large enterprises can be privatized only on the basis of a full public auction, with a lower than permissible limit of the share of employee stockholding. In small enterprises, this share may be in the upper limits, and it also takes into account other forms, such as tenancy and leases.

One of the most difficult questions which if not solved would make it hard to obtain public acceptance, is the matter of appraising the enterprise's assets. The draft provides several methods for assessing the enterprise's resources: by assessing the enterprises acts (documents), by evaluating the capitalized profits, or finally by evaluating the past ability to bring a profit. All of these methods are burdened with certain errors, nevertheless until the market ensures sufficient verification, these mechanisms will be unavoidable. It is most difficult to assess the assets of an enterprise which does not export, therefore there is no practical way of proving its "value" by the world market.

Another entry in the draft law also appears to be important—that which permits the state to intervene in the case of privatization of enterprises of special importance to the local society. Certain exceptions are made to the general rule on the protection of the interests of the state treasury. If the factory is the only workplace for the citizenry, e.g., in a small town, and a buyer cannot be found at the price established in the course of the appraisal of the enterprise's assets, it can be sold "at a loss", and even with additional payment out of the state treasury. But during the discussion a question arose as to whether this interventionism is to be in the nature of a subsidy or, e.g., investment or tax relief, which, to the ministry of industry, seemed to be a more economical move.

On one point the majority of the KERM members agreed: Privatization must be conducted quickly and decisively. Even if, as a result of the pressure of time, a high price for the privatized national asset is not obtained at auction, the benefits to the state treasury can be guaranteed in the future by higher tax revenues from efficiently managed privatized enterprises.

The final form of the draft will be decided during the discussion of the ministry representatives next week. The week after that it should be taken up at the Council of Ministers meeting.

#### Sharper Political Divisions Expected

90EP0415B Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* in Polish  
3-4 Feb 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by Piotr Aleksandrowicz]

[Text] Privatization of the Polish economy will change the country's economic system into an efficient one. It

will avert the specter of the cultural and technological collapse of the state, the economy, and society.

There is no efficient market economy without the domination of private ownership. But if a change in ownership relations is to produce maximum benefits, it must be made according to certain rules. It must bring about the creation of a capital market and a broad strata of owners of securities, who will constitute a social base of support for the new system.

Second, privatization should fulfill, as broadly as possible, the criteria of social justice. The assets which were unquestionably produced by society cannot return to only selected groups in this society. Third, during the process of privatization, the interests of Polish capital must be preserved. The funds of the small saver and the important entrepreneur cannot be dominated by foreign capital. Fourth, privatization must eliminate the no-owner sector, enhance labor efficiency in enterprises, and facilitate structural transformations.

Past discussions on privatization lead to several conclusions. One of the key questions appears to be the tempo of changes. There is no time for long-term, step-by-step, gradual privatization. The market mechanism now being introduced will not be successful if a leap in efficiency is not made, if most of the economy is not commercialized and privatized in a relatively short time.

Privatization cannot be made according to bureaucratic procedures which are difficult for the public to understand. Nor can they be made mainly with the thought of fiscal results.

The social aspect of privatization is incredibly important. Unquestionably the operation in some, even if in small part, should have the character of a universal transfer of ownership for a modest or even a symbolic fee. This requires a sense of justice towards the citizenry and the absolute requirement that public support be obtained for privatization.

Privatization will evoke the ideological resistance of the leftist circles—including the self-management and social-democratic ones, and the advocates of universal employee stockholding. The advocates are motivated on the one hand by a leftist ideology, and on the other hand by purely parochial interests.

This concept has not been tested anywhere on a large scale. Where employee stockholding has a certain importance and brings positive results, it was introduced in a limited range and primarily in a market environment, in which private firms and stock companies with universally available stock, dominate. Employee stockholding which limits the buying and selling of stock makes it impossible to create a capital market, and consequently a growth in management efficiency by virtue of correct investment of financial resources.

Employee stockholding under Polish conditions is socially unfair. It immediately excludes enormous social

groups from the individual benefits of privatization—for example, employees in education, the health service, farmers, craftsmen, students, retirees, etc. It gives preference to employees of enterprises. It differentiates the latter according to whether they work in old factories or modern ones. It creates castes and divides people. Employee stockholding as the basis of privatization would also mean victory for group interests, the victory of the egoists over the broad social interest in creating an efficient market economy with a modern structure. Certain preferences for employees in privatized enterprises are indicated, but on a limited scale.

The problem of privatization will certainly lead to a sharpening of political divisions in parliament, e.g., inside the Citizens Parliamentary Club. The laws pertaining to this problem are not ordinary laws. Privatization is new ownership. In privatization we may not make a mistake, hence the proper preparation of the process in a relatively short time is so very difficult. But we must not wait.

Properly conducted privatization, taking into account the element of universal ownership, may very quickly produce important economic benefits, a growth in the feeling of affluence, an improvement in the work efficiency of the individual citizens, enterprises, and the entire economy.

Privatization conducted improperly may threaten the existence of the state and the economy. The advocates of employee stockholding and self-management experimentation on a large scale should not push in that direction. Privatization must be conducted according to proved models and must be universal and public-spirited.

#### **Agriculture: Temporary Council Formed for Purchasing Intervention**

90EP0398A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 7, 17 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by Iwona Parchimowicz: "For the Time Being, A Winged Minister"]

[Text] "Farming does not pay," they say, "because farmers sell cheap and buy dear." Consumers are not content either. The market continues to totter. This market was supposed to be protected by the Farm Market Agency and the antimonopoly law. They do not protect it, because the Sejm acknowledged that the bill was not ready and sent it back to be amended. But, as the Ministry of Agriculture's press communique of 31 January proclaims, the Temporary Market Council, which was appointed by the premier, decided to make an interventionist purchase of cattle. The Ministry of Agriculture has already informed the voivodes (the so-called telex law) that it is the duty meat plants to conduct the interventionist purchase and that they will receive money for this purpose.

Farmers are getting rid of animals "on the way to the bank," even those that should be allotted for further



breeding. In a few months, an "animal depression" will threaten. Yet today it is not possible to buy everything that breeders are offering.

The reduction in the demand for meat products is not a bottleneck at all, but rather the lack of so-called slaughtering capabilities. "We have a guaranteed market, even if it is the Main Administration of State Reserves," says Julian Keska, director of the Meat Industry Enterprise of Rzeszow. In the middle of January, the reserves administration made an offer to the meat plants to take sides of pork and beef quarters—at market prices plus the entire cost of slaughter.

Supervision of the reserves is administered by the deputy minister of the domestic market, Włodzimierz Hausner, who was got his wings from the Council of Ministers' resolution of 11 December 1989 on the principles of creating and administering state reserves. In the resolution, we read about economic activity and especially about "the realization of an active supply policy."

This simply has to do with buying when there is a lot, preserving it in freezers, and selling when there is less. The Temporary Farm Market Council is proposing identical operations. Of course, the temporary council is not the same as the agency. Deputy Premier Czesław Janicki promised the Sejm deputies that the agency will begin its operations on 1 Feb. For the time being, however, there is no suitable law. Work on a bill goes on. It was discussed last week in KERM [Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers], this week the Council of Ministers will finally formulate it. The Sejm will be able to enact it in the middle of March at the earliest.

What is this Farm Market Agency to be? Probably it will turn out to be a combination budgetary unit (because allocations will be made) and state enterprise (because it will yield profits), all subject to the premier. The main goal of its existence is to counteract sudden price changes in the farming and food markets.

The interventionist purchase of raw materials and food products is not the only way to stabilize prices. Equally important will be market research; the establishment of trends in agricultural production; the creation of an entire system of quick information about prices; the organization of commodities markets; export; and the organization of storage and processing.

The next question: what sort of organizational shape will it have? One can suppose that, as an organ with powers of decision and supervision, there will be a chief council, which will have a chairman, and there will be an office under the agency's chairman to execute the decisions. The premier would appoint (and recall) the members of the council and the chairman as well. The premier could also suspend the execution of a resolution of the chief council and oblige the council to abolish it in case it was confirmed that it was contrary to law or it threatened the

interests of the national economy. The chairman appointed by the chief council would establish the prices for interventionist purchases. The agency would not pay any dividends, income tax, or turnover tax. It would receive allocations that were accounted for in the state budget.

This is all beautiful. However, a few threats exist: First of all, in order to have a real influence on the food market, it would be necessary to buy, preserve, and sell at least six to seven percent of the agricultural products consumed monthly. Ten to twenty trillion zlotys will be needed annually for this. The state budget calls for somewhat less than a trillion for the agency.... Second, if the agency buys expensive products—costly due to freeing up the prices of the means of production—their future selling price will be greatly increased by energy intensive (freezers) preservation. Third, it is not completely certain that officials will be able to create a precise system of information regarding predicted purchase prices, and it is uncertain whether, when a radical decrease threatens, they will be able to come into the market and buy what should be bought before it begins. This would ensure farmers a stable profitability of agricultural production, and it would ensure consumers of the continuity of supplies, because during "the depression" it would put into motion the reserves collected in freezers.

The experiences of other countries indicate that one may precisely intervene only when minimum purchase prices are defined so that efficient farms are guaranteed profitable production. For example, in the EC, the Community Intervention Commission fixes a so-called basic price of cattle, which is based on the average costs of production (where average defines efficient) along with the costs of slaughter. The commission intervenes if the purchase price falls to less than 104 percent of the basic price.

The agency can not limit itself to interventionist purchases; it should not merely be the next organizer of state reserves. It is also indispensable as an effective instrument of counteracting the deepening of the "animal depression." And it should become that as soon as possible, because to rebuild the stock of hogs—for biological considerations alone—it will be necessary to wait a year, and to rebuild the cattle herds, several years.

It is time to call this thing by its name. Minimum purchase prices for farm products are indispensable; the matter under discussion is for which farms will they ensure profitability. Fortunately, there is no shortage of pragmatists in the agriculture department. Deputy Minister Michał Wojtczak has announced "the struggle for a purchase price that will ensure a minimum of profitability to agricultural production." I believe that the law on the Farm Market Agency should not overlook the matter of minimum guaranteed prices. Otherwise, the agency will be a powerless creation.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### Press Restructuring, Massive Change Examined

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[Article by Dr Gunter Holzweissig, department head at the Gesamtdeutsches Institut in Berlin: "The GDR Press Breaking Down"]

[Text] Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler was able to make good on his promise. In his 30 October 1989 obituary on the "Black Channel" on GDR television's First Program he had announced that he will continue his work as "a communist and journalist as the only alternative to inhuman capitalism." A satirical magazine with its editorial headquarters in Frankfurt/Main, the lack of taste in which exceeds by far its satiric content, made room for von Schnitzler in the "Red Channel" column.<sup>1</sup> In it he tearfully complains that now, "thanks to new freedom of the press" he no longer has access to the media in his own country. In his unmistakable diction the former chief TV commentator, whose involvement prior to the new era was likewise much sought after, particularly for NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, went on to say: The "suddenly free GDR media are falling all over themselves with false reports, denunciations, official denials and 'excuses'; freedom equal to irresponsibility? Yes indeed, it has become quite fashionable to speak of the journalist's professional honor and ethos."

In contrast to that, just before the radical change, Juergen Kuczynski, Nestor of GDR economists, expressed his displeasure about the old media policy: "As far as intellectual life is concerned, the following must be said: Above all else, there is an absence of difference of opinion and criticism. Yet, public discussion of contradictions is a prerequisite for solving them. If we take a look at our press of 40 years ago, at that time it was decidedly more vital and more vigorous than today. Letters which are printed today on very rare occasions are tedious agreements without any inherent consideration of the problem."<sup>2</sup>

In Kuczynski's opinion the GDR press has been in a state of collapse since mid-October 1989. At a breath-taking rate it was able to free itself from the bonds of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Politburo which has now been dissolved. But this process is not yet finished. The comments below provide an interim balance sheet of the most important changes in the GDR press up to mid-January 1990.

### SED Media Policy From Krenz to Gysi

The 11 October 1989 SED Politburo statement, which was composed while Erich Honecker was still in office, also contained the demand for "life-oriented media" which in the past had turned into a debased hollow word.<sup>3</sup> In addition to electing Egon Krenz as new general secretary, the first personnel measures taken by the Ninth SED Central Committee meeting included the

immediate dishonorable removal of Joachim Herrmann who, by Honecker's order, as Central Committee secretary in charge of "agitation and propaganda," was responsible for the media being anything but life-oriented and a "people's tribunal."

The "new era" which was proclaimed by Egon Krenz in his full-bodied inaugural speech at first promised journalists only little hope for improved working conditions. To be sure, according to Krenz, in the future there was to be no more "embellishment," but socialism—and with it the SED's dominant role—was not to be put into early retirement. It was surmised that drafting Krenz' speech was among the last of Joachim Herrmann's official actions. Thus, the new general secretary challenged journalists to promote with "pleasure in their work" and the "political struggle" the exchange of ideas with their readers, listeners and viewers. Krenz directed special expectations at NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and AKTUELLE KAMERA. However, there was by no means any hint of glasnost in what Krenz was thinking because he gave this unmistakable warning: "Naturally this means that every journalist must be aware of the chattels of such responsibility. Our press cannot become a tribunal for aimless, anarchistic chatter. It will certainly not be a playground for demagogues...."<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, in any case, after Krenz took office the SED still had its party journalists under control to some extent. At the 10th meeting of the SED Central Committee, 8-9 November, people spoke their minds at great length about the old media policy which was a failure. The contribution to the discussion by Guenter Schabowski, who was selected as Herrmann's successor, is a unique document from an authoritative source, one which gives a detailed description of the debasing of the media into compliant party tools.<sup>5</sup> Schabowski, of course, was well aware of the fact that he himself was one of the most prominent "opportunists." In 1978 he had at one time taken over an important party office from Joachim Herrmann, namely editor in chief of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND [ND]. Thus, at a press conference an ND correspondent, who in his time was fired by Schabowski, asked him how he justifies himself as a reformer since he was, after all, involved in everything which he was condemning today. Thereupon Schabowski repeated the formulaic excuse which has since been adopted by other prominent journalists and which he had used in his Central Committee speech: As editor in chief of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND he had been both subject and object of a policy which today is deplorable.<sup>6</sup>

In the short time that Egon Krenz was in office, Guenter Schabowski may well have been the most important PR man on- and off-stage. He did not avoid any public discussion, even when he was mercilessly booed at during the large 4 November demonstration in East Berlin. His casual reference to the opening of the borders on the occasion of the 9 November press conference was staged in a way which demonstrated professional media effectiveness.

Schabowski no longer wanted to link his new function as Politburo secretary with "agitation and propaganda." Instead of this he created the term "information system and media policy" for his area of responsibility. Thus, he by no means viewed himself as "protector of the media." Rather, he wanted to cultivate "a comradely style of reciprocal consultations and information for both sides to use." A priority issue for him is enabling the communists via the media to be in a position to effectively advocate the party line on the job.<sup>7</sup>

On 7 November, under Schabowski's aegis, Wolfgang Meyer replaced Kurt Blecha, who since 1958 as manager of the "press office for the chairman of the Council of Ministers" had been responsible for controlling all media except the SED press. Meyer was formerly an ADN [German General News Service] journalist in New York and most recently manager of the main press office at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The office of government press spokesman was created for him at the same time. On 30 November Meyer announced that his office had been renamed the "GDR Government Press and Information Service."<sup>8</sup> The makeup of the personnel in the service will reflect the "character of the coalition cabinet." At the same time Meyer rejected accusations by the LDPD [Liberal Democratic Party of Germany] organ DER MORGEN that the media would continue under the SED dictate. Radio, television, and the ADN news agency will now no longer be tied to the party. Moreover, Meyer stated that following the dissolution of the State Committee for Radio and Television, the Council of Ministers had named former Minister for Culture Hans Bentzien general manager of television and Manfred Klein, head of GDR radio news, general manager of radio.

On 1 December, with only five abstentions, the People's Chamber voted to eliminate the SED's dominant role from Article 1 of the Constitution. Two days later Egon Krenz together with his Politburo and the SED's Central Committee members resigned. For the media this signified another important step on the path toward independence.

At the special party congress on 17 December Gregor Gysi, the new SED-PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] chairman, in his statement of basic principles made extensive remarks about his party's future media policy.<sup>9</sup> He made a plea for more pluralism and introduced suggestions for the planned media law. However, he primarily concentrated on improving his party's publicity efforts with respect to the 6 May 1990 elections for the People's Chamber.

Gysi announced the issuing of a press and information service as well as the appointment of a permanent SED-PDS press spokesman. Previously an "SED consultation and information center" had been established for party members and interested citizens at the office of the party executive committee. Renowned media specialist Lothar Bisky was entrusted with the honorary management of a newly created "Media and Press Commission"

for the party executive committee. Bisky's task is no longer comparable to Herrmann's and Schabowski's role which went beyond party authority. Bisky did not give up his position as rector at the Advanced School for Film and Television in Potsdam-Babelsberg although for the present he was also entrusted with managing the "Commission on Education and Schooling" for the party executive committee. All full-time department managers of the old Central Committee were recalled on 31 December 1989.<sup>10</sup>

### Direct Effects on the Press

The SED's losses by erosion from Egon Krenz to Gregor Gysi's SED-PDS resulted in substantial changes in the GDR's press landscape. This also affected the newspapers of the former bloc parties and the those of the mass organizations.

From November 1989 to mid-January 1990 all editors in chief of the 17 SED newspapers had to vacate their offices. In addition, countless veteran journalists departed from the ranks of the editorial staffs. The personnel merry-go-round started with the Karl-Marx-Stadt FREIE PRESSE whose former editor in chief and his deputy—the latter is said to have broken away to the West—were accused, among other things, of having misappropriated funds from the solidarity actions of the Journalists Association.<sup>11</sup> On 11 December the LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU reported that the then editor in chief had been relieved of his office at his own request. The new editor in chief, Wolfgang Nagorske, was chosen "in a free, open, and secret election." At the same time, the newspaper apologized for the fact that in the past it had allowed itself to be party to a false media policy because there had been "interference" by external "authorities" who had obstructed the work of the journalists.

Former sciences department head at ND, Wolfgang Spickermann, now editor in chief of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, did not, of course, use such clear language. In addition to general statements of intent with respect to improving reporting he referred tersely to the new masthead without actually naming editor in chief Herbert Naumann who had been replaced and the four deputy editors in chief, Alfred Kobs, Hajo Herbell, Werner Micke, and Harald Wessel who likewise had been fired.<sup>12</sup> They were all among the falcons of the ND's editorial office. On the other hand there was no information concerning the circumstances of their departure or how the new editor in chief was chosen. As expected, the editors in chief of the FDJ's [Free German Youth] JUNGE WELT, the SED's officious BERLINER ZEITUNG and the GDR's only tabloid BZ AM ABEND were also fired.

The bloodletting of experienced journalists, even though they were tainted by the past, resulted in substantial personnel problems as the foreign policy editor of JUNGE WELT, Wolfgang Kohrt, frankly conceded in response to the NEW YORK TIMES, and in so doing at

the same time criticized the existing principles for selecting the next generation of journalists and training journalists in Leipzig.<sup>13</sup> The editor in chief at the TRIBUENE—which used to have the subtitle “Organ of the FDGB [Free German Labor Union Federation] Executive Committee” and which has been appearing since 4 December 1989 with a blue heading and the subtitle “Trade Union Newspaper” was replaced. This was also true of the editors in chief at the DBD’s [Democratic Peasant Party of Germany] BAUERN ECHO, the CDU’s [Christian Democratic Union] NEUE ZEIT and the LDPD’s DER MORGEN. These newspapers no longer appear as their party’s central organs, but rather as “Daily Newspaper of the Democratic Peasant Party of Germany,” “Daily Newspaper of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany,” and “Newspaper of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany.” Jens Koenig, editor in chief of JUNGE WELT, stated in the 10 January 1990 issue of his newspaper that from now on it would no longer be a “stooge” for the FDJ or the SED. Instead of being the “Organ of the FDJ’s Central Council” the JW [JUNGE WELT] has since been subtitled the “Leftists Socialist Youth Newspaper.”

Several SED newspapers immediately made multiple changes in their subtitles. Thus, after the 3 December resignation of the Central Committee the ND no longer signed off as the “Organ of the Central Committee,” but rather starting 4 December as the “Central Organ of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.” Effective 18 December, following the conclusion of the SED-PDS special party congress, the subtitle was quite simply just “Socialist Daily.” Of course, the masthead now has: “Newspaper of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany—Party of Democratic Socialism.” Since then the slogan “Proletariat of all countries—unite!” which had been there since 1 May 1958, is no longer present in the heading. Because of critical reactions ND editor in chief Spickermann felt it necessary to explain this the next day in the squib entitled “New in the Heading”: “We obviously propose continuing the work of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. This work includes the Communist Manifesto. Yet at the same time our new modern socialist party is closely linked to a social-democrat, socialist, anti-Fascist, and pacific heritage. The stereotypical parading of slogans or governing principles—we should all have learned this lesson from the past, too—is of no value either in refurbishing this heritage or in preparing and realizing a realistic policy which is committed to democratic socialism.”<sup>14</sup>

With the reshaping of their titles the SED bezirk newspapers developed a number of individual initiatives. For example, in December 1989 the LAUSITZER RUND-SCHAU appeared with a different layout four different times. At first, as in the past, it represented itself as the organ of the “SED Newspaper” of the Cottbus Bezirk administration and finally as the “Socialist Daily for Cottbus Bezirk.” Shortly after that, like the ND, it also eliminated the “proletariat slogan” which at first was imitated by only a few of the SED bezirk newspapers.

The subtitle of the LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG was the source of displeasure; it is now the “Organ for the Interests of All Working Peoples.” Non-SED-PDS members perceived this as being presumptuous. Moreover, the Leipzig Social Democrats (SDP) demanded return of the newspaper since it had been founded in 1894 as the organ of social democracy.

On the other hand there was popular acceptance of the new SED newspaper subtitles, FREIES WORT in Suhl (“Socialist Daily for South Thuringia”) and VOLK-SWACHT in Gera (“East Thuringian Socialist Daily”) because they match the widespread desire for reestablishing Thuringia as a Land.

In East Berlin on 10 January there was a discussion by the editors in chief and publishing house managers of the SED-PDS bezirk newspapers with Party Chairman Gregor Gysi which promised the longer-term formation of publishing house associations. However, just three days later the party presidium, obviously because of the desperate state of fiscal affairs and the public criticisms of the party’s press monopoly, passed a resolution to give up 11 of the 16 newspaper publishers which are members of the party’s ZENTRAG [Central Printing, Purchasing, and Auditing Association] and also 21 of a total of 26 newspaper printing shops and to transfer them to “public ownership.”<sup>14a</sup>

Beyond that, during the next week the 14 SED-PDS bezirk newspapers declared their independence and in part adopted new names. The Erfurt newspaper DAS VOLK became the THUERINGER ALLGEMEINE and the VOLKSWACHT which is printed in Gera became the OSTTHUERINGER NACHRICHTEN. Still other newspapers were looking for new names. In almost all statements concerning their own affairs there was an assertion of future editorial independence. This presumably happened against the background of the SED-PDS’ announcement that on 31 March 1990 it would cease subsidizing its former newspapers. That is why these price increases from 15 to 50 pfennig per copy were characterized as unavoidable. Even BERLINER ZEITUNG issued a statement along these lines (22 January 1990), since the SED-PDS also pulled back from the “Berlin Publishing House.”

What happened in the case of magazines in the time frame under study was totally unclear. At first they had editorial difficulties in adjusting to the new political situation. In part they got by with emphatic references to copy deadlines. HORIZONT, the monthly newspaper which deals with foreign policy, in its December 1989 issue requested its readers to provide suggestions for future editorial work because of the “far-reaching changes in our republic.” GEWERKSCHAFTSLEBEN, the FDGB’s monthly magazine, was temporarily closed down in order—as was stated—to increase the allocation of paper for the daily newspaper TRIBUENE.<sup>15</sup> For EINHEIT, the SED’s theoretical organ, changes in personnel and content will be forthcoming.<sup>16</sup> NEUER WEG, the SED functionary’s magazine which appears



every two weeks, and even JUNGE GENERATION, the FDJ Central Council's monthly organ, were shut down. In Spring 1990 it is to be replaced by a "political magazine which is suited to the times" for young working people.

START, a monthly organ, which has a costly layout, of the executive committee of the German Gymnastics and Sports Federation, for financial reasons published issue No 1/1990 as its last issue.

Moreover, military-political magazines such as the GST [Society for Sport and Technology] magazine KONKRET and internal NVA [National People's Army] publications like PARTEIARBEITER and WISSEN UND KAEMPFFEN were shut down. After the resolution to dissolve the SED militia groups, their organ DER KAEMPFER likewise was no longer published.

New magazines were announced for 1990, such as FREIDENKER or even RECHENTECHNIK/DATENVERARBEITUNG from the Wirtschaft Publishing House. The weekly newspaper DIE WIRTSCHAFT, which was closed down in 1983, will once again be published by this company. Consideration is being given to once again publishing the student magazine FORUM which was shut down in May 1983 and for a time was very critical. The New Forum received approval for a weekly newspaper with a print run of 100,000 copies.<sup>17</sup>

Fulfilling the widely stirred up desires for increases in newspaper print runs and for establishing new magazines depends in large measure on the allocation of paper and printing capacities. This will require external material support since the resources necessary to do this will no doubt be inadequate even after closing down publications with outdated propagandistic content.

### Glasnost Over Night

"Almost all newspapers are becoming more colorful. What does that mean for us?" was the wording of the top lines of the FDJ's organ JUNGE WELT (14/15 October 1989). Below that, in small print, the ironic answer: "The fall vacation time is here!" NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, still using the old official bombastic party style, came out with a report (20 October 1989) about Egon Krenz' discussion with machine tool peasants in the VEB [state enterprise] 7 October in East Berlin under the headline: "Openness, Deliberation, and Constructiveness." Of course, ND readers of many years could not believe their eyes when they saw the subheading "Segment of the party congress discussion in a way which would have been unthinkable just two weeks ago."

After Krenz took office the SED's objective was clear. The errors of the past were, of course, to be addressed more or less openly and even the names of those responsible were to be cited, but there was not to be any shaking of the fundamental positions of socialism. Somewhat more transparency and information providing pleasure, as for example about previously forbidden details of

Politburo and Central Committee meetings, were supposed to satisfy party members and the people. Yet the SED was no longer the only one in control of events. Both its own membership and that of the former bloc parties and especially the newly developed opposition groups and parties refused to be put off any longer with half-truths. Continuously supported by hundreds of thousands peaceful demonstrators in Leipzig and other GDR cities they also forced the turning point in the media policy which the press had to follow up on with varying degrees of intensity.

In the final days of Honecker's time in office it became clear that the SED's traditional control mechanisms were no longer functioning properly. The "recommendations" of the Central Committee's departments for "agitation and propaganda" which were transmitted from there directly to the SED media or via the press office to the remaining editorial offices, obviously no longer existed. The major support for the party's official media policy continued to be the material from ADN, the state news agency, which had seen to it that news releases were in harmony because its reports—particularly the politically explosive ones—had to be placed unchanged and frequently at the prescribed spot: no editorial revision was permitted. Of course, technically the principle of individual responsibility on the part of editors in chief previously held true. Fear of subsequent censorship and control, however, made them act with precipitous submissiveness. They were the real accomplices of the SED's media policy. That is why most of them had to give up their office although even their subordinates, something which many of them publicly admitted afterwards, had conformed for the same motives against their better judgment.

On 11 October 1989, even before Egon Krenz assumed office, the CDU's organ NEUE ZEIT on its own ignored the unwritten rules for reporting. The editors shortened—which for Western editors is a foregone conclusion—an ADN report about a statement by the minister of the interior concerning the demonstration after the holidays on the occasion of the 40th anniversary and even set the remaining part of the text in the subjunctive. Thus, for example, the ADN report of 10 October 1989 read as follows: "It is true that rowdies, incited troublemakers, and criminal elements yelled slogans hostile to the state and violently attacked the People's Police who were trying to maintain order. They threw stones, bottles and powder trains, used steel bars and other hitting devices to brutally and mercilessly attack the security forces. And it was not by chance that many of the brawlers wore protective helmets which points to deliberate and planned actions."<sup>18</sup> NEUE ZEIT turned this into the following: "The People's Police involved in maintaining the peace were allegedly violently attacked, pelted with stones, bottles and powder trains."<sup>19</sup> NEUE ZEIT does not at all expect its readers to believe the Ministry of the Interior's assertion that Western correspondents were part of the "organizers and instigators." Even ADN journalists, most of whom are SED members,

did not identify themselves with this report. They used it to threaten refusal to write any more reports when ordered if these were to represent peaceful demonstrators as "rowdies." In enterprises where they wanted to do interviews, they had been insulted by workers because of dishonest reporting.<sup>20</sup> The ADN enterprise group of the Journalists Association demanded that a media conference be called and that a media law be prepared because "the situation can no longer exist where the high-handed actions of individuals replace the collective wisdom in the information and media policy, where the people are not informed, are poorly informed or even falsely informed in their media, where in representing our country the field is left to the media of the class opponent."<sup>21</sup> ADN was even praised for correctly reproducing a telephone conversation between FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Egon Krenz by the FRG's government spokesman, adding nothing.<sup>22</sup>

In the first three months after the beginning of the new era glasnost in the GDR press proceeded on two tracks. On the one hand on the level of the SED media and on the other in the press of the former bloc parties and in individual New Forum publications.

The SED media—including radio and television—mainly reported on scandals of the past. Among others, these include the political failure of former Politburo members, their posh life in Wandlitz, the fate of political prisoners in Bautzen prison, the question of guilt in connection with the "sputnik" prohibition or the expulsion, which Margot Honecker caused, of four East Berlin secondary school pupils in fall 1988. In so doing they occasionally became overzealous, thus lacking journalistic cautiousness and experience, so that it became necessary to apologize to those affected. It may have been especially painful for NEUES DEUTSCHLAND to apologize for one of its own articles which, to be sure, was published before the new era.<sup>23</sup> The alleged abduction of a MITROPA [Central European Dining- and Sleeping-car Corporation] cook to the West using doctored menthol cigarettes was staged by the state security service which the newspaper confessed in installments.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, as a rule the SED newspapers only scratched the surface of the problems, or they only became active if the pressure from below could no longer be contained. Otherwise they then tried to support the current government using arguments without conveying their own own ideas in the process. This permits the conclusion that in spite of the weakening of the party apparatus the informal information lines were still functioning well.

Although the CDU, the LDPD, the DBD and the NDPD [National Democratic Party of Germany] are placing ministers in Modrow's coalition cabinet, their press no longer views itself as a government mouthpiece. For them—while protecting their specific party interests in the election campaign which is beginning—it is a matter of not only coping with the errors of the past, but also learning from them and making suggestions about the future shaping of economic and political life. While the

SED press taboos do not apply to them to the extent that the obvious is now cited for what it is, the other party organs are making even future tasks into problems, as for example, introducing the social market economy, the national future of the two German states or even the partial transformation of agricultural producer cooperatives into private enterprises as well as the systematic support of private craftsmanship.

Specific suggestions for formulating the planned media law were proposed not only by the professional groups affected, but primarily by the media of the former bloc parties. They emphatically criticized the unbroken influence of the SED-PDS on the electronic media. NEUE ZEIT publicly censured the hypocrisy of the impartiality displayed by TV moderators during political discussions. The selection of the scenes during the first broadcast of "Election 90" on the First Program reminded the paper of the practice of the "Black Channel." NEUE ZEIT continued literally as follows: "For this reason, in democracies not far from us, it is customary to give parties in an election campaign their own broadcast time. Allowing the diverse political programs of GDR television, which in the future will be public, to be evaluated for the general public almost solely from the point of view of SED-PDS members and journalists who were educated for the class struggle (in this connection we do not exclude honest transformations) cannot and must not continue."<sup>25</sup>

LDPD chairman Manfred Gerlach likewise expressed his displeasure about the government's media policy in his party's organ. The existing state committees for television and radio are dissolved. Social councils should be established, that is where the parties should be involved. We wanted to and should be able to be influential. Nothing has happened. As parties we hardly have any opportunities to represent ourselves. There can be no agreement with this."<sup>26</sup>

NEUE ZEIT commented the next day on a full-page SED-PDS campaign ad in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND of 21 December 1989: "Really shrewd: All the nice things, which in part were still inconceivable or forbidden, are written on the flag, and moreover everything else is called 'right'... Because who wants to be for neo-Fascism and Rightist radicalism! Thus there does not seem to be anything else left to do but to elect that party which has undergone such radical renewal that it now takes care of all good things. That we have very clearly passed by what is happening in Romania now seems to be forgotten."<sup>27</sup>

Within a three-month period the GDR press has in fact become more colorful. Uniformity in layout and commentary is over. It is no longer enough to read only NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in order to be informed about published and public opinion in the GDR. Cartoons, even if as a rule not particularly well done, break up the monotony. For the first time the otherwise so prudish NEUES DEUTSCHLAND carried a nude photo on the occasion of a PLAYBOY press conference in East Berlin.<sup>28</sup> The ND even used photos to report on house

occupations which were a fact prior to the new era in the GDR.<sup>29</sup> Readers' letters are obviously only accepted in rare instances.

### Opening to the West Rich in Foreign Currency

On 19 December 1989 in Dresden, FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl and GDR Minister President Hans Modrow came to agreement on what was successfully in place just prior to the first meeting of the two politicians: cooperation between the electronic and print media of both German states. GDR authorities silently tolerated importing political literature, FRG daily newspapers and magazines—supported by publicity for gift subscriptions to GDR inhabitants. The exchange of newspapers which the FRG Government had been demanding since 1971—in 1964 Walter Ulbricht made a dummy offer in this connection—had for all practical purposes begun with the unrestricted sale of East Berlin newspapers in (West) Berlin since 11 December. Mid-November the first daily newspapers published—and now they are all doing it—Western TV programming. The illustrated program magazine FF DABEL started extensive reprinting of Western programming in No 51/1989, beginning at 1700 hours and since January 1990 even included the late-morning program.

As sensational as all this might appear, readers did not believe their eyes when in December suddenly in part big advertisements by Western clients appeared in GDR newspapers. In addition, there were preliminary discussions about Western advertising spots on GDR television which promised to bring foreign currency to improve its programs.<sup>30</sup> West-German department store chains, mail-order houses, building and loan associations and coffee-roasting firms geared up for advertising campaigns in the GDR market. Lufthansa and Interflug jointly advertised their flight connections in a full-page ad in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.<sup>31</sup> West Berlin brokers, publishing houses and discount markets placed advertisements in various East Berlin newspapers. West Berlin CDU chairman Eberhard Diepgen, using half a page in the CDU's organ NEUE ZEIT at a cost of DM9,000<sup>32</sup> conveyed his Christmas greetings replete with his picture.<sup>33</sup>

TAGESSPIEGEL became the advertising agency for the LDPD organ DER MORGEN. Beyond that, the West Berlin newspaper made its weekly cultural program—editorially revised and complete with a large advertisement for the memoirs of Franz Josef Strauss—available to DER MORGEN. When the Brandenburg Gate was opened on 22 December DER MORGEN, together with "Hundert 6," a private broadcast station which was still being jammed by East Berlin just prior to the new era, produced a free extra edition for visitors to Berlin. In an announcement in BERLINER ZEITUNG the foundation for market testing called attention to its sales consultation service for GDR citizens in West Berlin at Alexanderplatz; this was even picked up in the editorial section with a photograph.<sup>34</sup>

When their advertising columns were opened up to "capitalist" customers the SED newspapers did not conceal their ideological stomach ache. The advertising income which they enthusiastically welcomed was, however, based on Western advertising prices. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND is said to be asking DM40,000 for a full page. Interwerbung, Ltd., which previously had sole responsibility for Western advertisements, was no longer involved in the transaction, much to the great regret of its manager.<sup>35</sup> A full-page advertisement in the December 15, 1989 issues of JUNGE WELT by the Quelle mail-order house caused the paper to provide an editorial justification: "Quelle—and in the future other firms and prospects are to represent one of many sources for JUNGE WELT to make the only German-language youth daily with a print run of 1.6 million into what it always should have been—a product. More specifically, the kind which does not cost the manufacturer more than the buyer, as is still the case for the time being—incomprehensibly—by force of law." At the same time JUNGE WELT encouraged GDR enterprises to go for "hopefully rising economic strength" on a larger scale for their products. Moreover, the editorial office reserves the right to decide on accepting advertisements. Advertisements which are hostile to the constitution or have pornographic content and those for alcohol and tobacco products will not be accepted.

Even BERLINER ZEITUNG saw itself forced to discuss in an editorial the advertisements from Western clients: "They do not exactly match the highest ideas and aspirations of the editors, but are no doubt very normal companion manifestations of open borders, of increasing East-West relations."<sup>36</sup> In this connection nothing can be said about a going-out-of-business sale of the GDR or about preparation for reunification. The issue is solely that of business relations in which in the future the GDR economy should have even greater involvement. Since the costs of the BZ cannot in any way whatsoever be covered by the unit sales price of 15 pfennig, it is possible, as is true of many newspapers throughout the world, to get out of the red ink only by advertising income. At present BZ is transferring all foreign currency income to the national budget, "thus to support the GDR's ability to effect imports." A few days later, however, BZ revealed for the first time that since 1954 it has been an SED enterprise.<sup>37</sup>

From the perspective of additional foreign currency income, the West Berlin newspaper trade, by way of a test, was also supplied with NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (sales price DM1.20), JUNGE WELT (sales price DM1.20) and BERLINER ZEITUNG, BZ AM ABEND and DER MORGEN which were sold for DM0.90. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND was subsequently for sale at several FRG newsstands.

"In response to critical letters which complained about the fact that the lack of newspapers in the GDR would become even worse from selling them in the West, DER MORGEN stated that exporting newspapers had no effect on supplies in the GDR. Rather, the valuta income

would contribute to making the necessary printing paper available."<sup>38</sup> The correspondent for JUNGE WELT was surprised that someone who bought his newspaper in West Berlin came from the GDR, and he had of course been shocked by the price, but in view of the fact that he does not get a copy at home, he jumped at the opportunity.<sup>39</sup> After the rather large demand at first it was possible to sell only a part of the 20,000 daily newspapers which are delivered to the West every day. In spite of glasnost GDR newspaper are in demand only among individuals with above-average political interests whereas television is well received in the West.

At first it remained unclear when and which Western newspapers can be sold without restriction in the GDR. There was thought of an agreement in the context of inner-German trade based on clearing units at a rate of 1:1 so that there would be no losses for Western publishers. In the GDR the demand for Western publications might well be disproportionately greater than the interest of FRG citizens in GDR newspapers.

#### Summary and Outlook

At the turn of the year from 1989 to 1990 the euphoria in the GDR about the new freedom of the press had gradually abated. Of course not in the meaning of Karl-Eduard Schnitzler, who was quoted at the beginning of this report and to whom only some West German media still offer the questionable opportunity to put forth his case.

The SED's direct control of the press has indeed slipped, nonetheless even after the gradual dissolution of the SED-PDS' press empire there continues to be a lack of the most important material foundations. Totally outdated rotary presses and a shortage of paper<sup>40</sup> hamper the desired comprehensive and up-to-date reportage. Elimination of the non-negotiability notes for subscriptions, effective 1 January 1990, by the postal newspaper service is causing greater sales problems, and the associated insignificant increases in print runs would not be able to keep up with demand.<sup>41</sup>

SED-PDS chairman Gregor Gysi and Lothar Bisky, his colleague in the presidium, had, to be sure, emphatically stated that the party would not give up what belongs to it. On the other hand, they were unable to avoid a review of the economic efficiency of the party's publishing system, because the high newspaper subsidies must be reduced because of the substantial price increases which have been announced. In addition, there is the fact that the editorial infrastructure at almost all newspapers is inadequate and would have to be modernized on a priority basis. Establishing private publishing companies with Western involvement would be the only way to be able to provide quick remedial action here, then newspapers would have to compete with one another in openly for readers and advertisers.

Future stimulating topics might well include discussion about privatizing the newspapers and the ADN news agency in the process of shaping the media law—in

addition to transforming the radio and television facilities which are still dominated by the SED-PDS into public institutions. Since this is to take place on a short-term basis and in the midst of the election campaigns, there might well be an unlucky star over this debate. The question could arise whether a law which applies to all media is even necessary. At the beginning of the 1950's there was consideration in the FRG of a Federal press law. However, with the agreement of all concerned this was soon rejected in favor of establishing the nationally independent "German Press Council." The ADN, with the participation of the newspaper publishers, could be transformed back into a company with limited liability. Only for radio and television would it be necessary to take legal precautionary measures which make possible cooperation and access by all socially relevant groups. Just as in the case of the Land press laws in the FRG—the rights and obligations of the publishing companies and their staff workers would have to be regulated. The right to freedom of opinion and the press should be more clearly anchored in the new constitution which is expected to be drawn up.

#### Footnotes

1. TITANIC, No 1, 1990, p 70.
2. BOERSENBLATT FUER DEN DEUTSCHEN BUCHHANDEL, No 40, 3 October 1989, p 753
3. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 12 October 1989.
4. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 19 October 1989.
5. The following quotation from Schabowski's speech makes this clear, but it also suggests that Schabowski did not want to move away from the party's dominant role: "The personally creative, personally responsible actions of comrade communists based on party resolutions is replacing instructions, administration, detailed spoon-feeding, when, where, in what typeface and with what register reports are to be made." (NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 11/12 November, 1989). On the day before, Guenther Jahn, former first secretary of the Potsdam SED Bezirk Administration, likewise engaged in a characteristic self-criticism at the Central Committee plenum: "In my speeches or in other appearances I have, of course, often not called a spade a spade, however, in publications I did subject myself for supposedly good intentions to self-censoring. The critical parts fell victim to the red pencil. The basic foolishness consisted in the view that one must not provide the ideological opponent with any ammunition for his media campaign. Today we know and sense that our media which are critical and close to real life not only deprive the enemy of ammunition, but (assuming the report is in fact true and linked with the people), also turn into ideological offensive weapons." (NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 10 November 1989).

In a "Report by Politburo members and secretaries of the former Central Committee" (excerpts in SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG, December 19, 1989), the account is



likewise settled with Joachim Herrmann's and Erich Honecker's media policy: "Joachim Herrmann, who after Honecker had to have had the primary responsibility for deforming the media, was a compliant implementer of the general secretary's instructions. Every day he accepted the latter's ideas about shaping NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and AKTUELLE KAMERA. News about facts which were not favorable to the government had been concealed in spite of the fact that FRG television reported it. 'There was massive intervention in artistic productions and publicity broadcasts on television. Journalists' creativity was fettered, accelerating the substantive and formal uniformity of the media.' The government's press office was the long arm of the agitation department; this office had control of the newspaper, the other political parties and organizations just as it did in the case of the party press."

6. In this connection see DER TAGESSPIEGEL, 12 November 1989.

7. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 10 November 1989.

8. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 1 December 1989.

9. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 18 December 1989.

10. In this connection see the interview with Lothar Bisky in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 2 January 1990.

11. See FREIE PRESSE 3 November and 5 December 1989.

12. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 16 November 1989.

13. "Mr. Kohrt said nearly all of the editors and reporters are the product of East Germany's main journalism school, attached to the University of Leipzig. 'The point is we can't really choose our staff,' he said. 'People start here as volunteers at age 19 or so and then we help select those who are to go study journalism. But the youth organization is the one that sends them back to us. You can study journalism, but that doesn't make you a journalist.'" (THE NEW YORK TIMES 8 December 1989).

14. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 19 December 1989.

14a. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 11, 15 January 1990.

15. TRIBUENE 5 December 1989.

16. See Manfred Banaschak "Concerning Our Own Affairs" in: EINHEIT, No 12, 1989, p 1075.

17. Moreover, at ADN it was stated that "DIE ANDERE, a newspaper for the New Forum and other initiatives with fundamental democratic orientations, announced that it would appear at the end of January 1990. In a press announcement the newspaper characterized itself as the first really independent, transregional weekly newspaper in the GDR." (NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 5 January 1990). In response to an inquiry (BERLINER MORGENPOST 7 January 1990), at the New Forum it was further stated that in various GDR cities small regional New Forum weekly

newspapers would appear; thus in Erfurt (NEZ), in Berlin Pankow (DIE PANKE), in Greifswald (NEUES FORUM), in Quedlinburg (QUEDLINBURGER WOCHENBLATT) and in Rostock (PLA TTFORM). Negotiations about publishing an independent daily had thus far proceeded unsuccessfully. With FRG help and financed by advertisements, the first independent city newspaper, which will be distributed free will appear in Jena.

18. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 11 October 1989.

19. NEUE ZEIT 11 October 1989.

20. See DER TAGESSPIEGEL 12 October 1989.

21. JUNGE WELT 28-29 October 1989.

22. See DER TAGESSPIEGEL 28 October 1989.

23. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 21 September 1989.

24. See NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 3 November 1989 and 5 January 1990.

25. NEUE ZEIT 21 December 1989.

26. DER MORGEN 21 December 1989.

27. NEUE ZEIT 22 December 1989.

28. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 28 December 1989.

29. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, December 30/31, December 1989.

30. See DER TAGESSPIEGEL 20 December 1989. The agencies which acquire advertisements for GDR newspapers are listed there.

31. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 11 December 1989.

32. See DER TAGESSPIEGEL 30 December 1989.

33. NEUE ZEIT 23 December 1989.

34. BERLINER ZEITUNG 16-17 December 1989.

35. See the interviews with Gunter Hackmesser in BERLINER RUNDFUNK 28 December 1989. Excerpts in: RIAS-MONITOR-DIENST 28 December 1989.

36. BERLINER ZEITUNG 21 December 1989.

37. BERLINER ZEITUNG 30-31 December 1989.

38. DER MORGEN 20 December 1989.

39. JUNGE WELT 12 December 1989.

40. In the past when a license was issued by the press office at the Council of Ministers, a definitive decision was made about the assignment of the paper allocation; in this connection SED newspapers were given disproportionate consideration. Since no thought can be given to increasing the annual production of newsprint, which currently amounts to 125,000 tons per year, because of the completely outdated technical equipment and the

nonexistent raw materials, as stated by Dietrich Arnold, deputy general director of the Heidenau Cellulose and Paper Combine (WOCHENPOST, No 47, 1980) the Council of Ministers must quickly redistribute the existing paper allocation.

41. In view of the increases in printruns which have been ordered, acute sales problems are developing, as NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (23/24 December 1989) learned from the manager of the railroad post office in the East Berlin main railroad station: "The railroad post office distributes all centrally printed newspapers and magazines to the GDR. However, in the face of the increases in printruns and new editions which are to be anticipated, it will have to give in, because it has reached whatever turnover limit is possible, as stated by the manager of the office."

## HUNGARY

### New Workers Council Federation Chairman Interviewed

25000692D Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 17 Mar 90 p 22

[Interview with Lajos Somlay, chairman of the National Workers Council, by Gabor Juhasz, place and date not given: "The chairman of the National Workers Council Responds: 'Only a Workforce Deprived of Its Rights Attracts Capital to Hungary Now'"—first paragraph is HETI VILAGGAZDASAG introduction]

[Text] At the organizational meeting of the National Federation of Workers Councils [MOSZ], the present practice of privatization was called a policy that is leading the country to ruin. Contrary to its 1956 predecessors, the organization, which is still awaiting registration in court, has no political ambitions. As its leaders say, the organization's place is in the plant, where political organizations have no place. We asked MOSZ Chairman Lajos Somlay (age 58) about how they want to achieve their goals. Somlay's primary job is as group leader at the Budapest Electrical Works, and at the same time, just like in 1956, he is chairman of his firm's workers council.

[HVG] What force is there behind the newly formed National Federation of Workers Councils, an organization whose name sounds historic?

[Somlay] The Federation was formed by delegates of 13 workers councils in late February. At present we have 40 member organizations, but these days we get up to three applicants per day. Soon we expect to represent 100 workers councils. There is no registered membership in workers councils. In some places 300 people stand behind a workers council, in other places there are 8,000. In addition, we have individual members, people who also participated in the 1956 workers council movement.

[HVG] The first workers councils organized last year in Herend and in Pet wanted to exercise ownership rights

and trade union rights at the same time. This idea is far removed from the principles espoused in 1956.

[Somlay] These organizations are not really workers councils, they are trade unions operating under this name. We, on the other hand, intend to return to the 1956 concept; we want to acquire property and would like to take responsibility for the enterprises.

[HVG] Did you discontinue your relations with these "workers councils" which perceived things in a different manner?

[Somlay] It's up to them whether they join our organization, and, quite naturally, they can do so only if they accept our bylaws.

[HVG] What legal arguments support your demands regarding ownership rights?

[Somlay] One of the typical causes that prompted the establishment of the present workers councils is the disintegration of enterprises which have units in the countryside. Most enterprise headquarters try to rescue a firm by closing down plants in the countryside. In such cases, workers councils want to take direction of plants condemned to be closed down into their own hands; they want to become independent.

[HVG] But is there a legal way to accomplish this?

[Somlay] There is, according to our experts. Enterprise councils are entitled to exercise management rights only, i.e. they are not owners, thus, after registering, the workers councils may take away through negotiations the management rights held by enterprise councils over firms owned by the state. For example, in the Magyarovar machine works that went independent from RABA, the workers council has ceased to exist, or more accurately it has transformed itself and continues with the independent factory under an enterprise council name.

[HVG] In other words, the persons changed; the leaders of the former workers council became members of the present enterprise council.

[Somlay] Yes, at present there is an opportunity for that. The other reason why the number of our organizations is increasing can be found in spontaneous privatization, the sale of factories. People recognize that enterprise managers create limited liability corporations out of the best, most profitable parts of firms: The leader becomes an adviser to the corporation for good money, and thereafter it does not matter how much the selling price is. On top of this, Hungarian enterprises often associate with adventurers [as published]; the new owner brings work here that cannot be performed elsewhere in Europe, such as work that is damaging to one's health. Only a work force deprived of its rights attracts capital to Hungary now. There is no difficulty here in dismissing a few hundred people; they need not struggle with strong

trade unions. We are fighting this kind of privatization, and thus the workers councils are also self-defense organizations.

[HVG] What do the trade unions have to say about the establishment of MOSZ?

[Somlay] They were suspicious about the initiative, although we stated that we were not a trade union. We want to cooperate with them, as well as with the parties.

[HVG] At the very beginning, several parties, such as the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the Social Democratic Party of Hungary [MSZDP], tried to win the confidence of the workers councils. Has the danger of "incorporation" passed?

[Somlay] We told them: We are and will be an organization independent from the parties, but one which nevertheless is prepared to cooperate with the parties. Our area of functioning is the plant, and political parties have no place in plants. We sense, of course, that many regard us as a background, as a mass base. Despite such endeavors, we have gotten in touch with 11 parties that ran a national slate. The only party we do not negotiate with is the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP], because they were the ones who liquidated the workers councils.

[HVG] What do you mean by sharing ownership? Should every worker become a stockholder?

[Somlay] Individually owned stock takes its ransom from workers, even if it can be paid for at preferred prices, in installments. The individual stockholder is aiming for dividends; we, on the other hand, endeavor to

acquire the authority to dispose over property. We demand an indivisible ownership share for the workers.

[HVG] What do workers have to say about this? Wouldn't they rather acquire individual ownership in their factories, stock which they could hand down?

[Somlay] People do not want dividends. They want work and good wages. Incidentally, workers councils are not opposed to privatization; all they want is for transformation plans to be discussed on time with the workers, and that the whole thing does not transpire over their heads.

[HVG] Why is it that most workers councils are formed in firms that are experiencing ultimate distress?

[Somlay] People are scared wherever there is work, if only for a year. They do not want to lose their jobs. Not too long ago we had a meeting where workers dared to talk to us only at a bus station far removed from the factory. This fear is the main obstacle to our organizing work; and the fact that we do not even have a newspaper. The legal situation of workers councils will have to be clarified soon in order to avoid dispute, to ensure our demands. According to our experts, at present not only do legal gaps exist; in our case there are legal abysses.

[HVG] To accomplish this, you need influence in Parliament, but will you have a representative in the new National Assembly?

[Somlay] The parties asked several members of workers councils that they be nominated, but we, as a federation, will have no representative. Also we should have a place in a bicameral parliament—one we would like to see—just as we demand a place in the directorate of the State Property Agency which oversees privatization.

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

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